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ABSTRACT
This essay consists of a critical discussion of the main 
theories of indirect discourse. It is first argued that the theory 
put forward by Frege is fundamentally inadequate, Frege views express­
ions in indirect speech as standing for intensional entities. But 
application of the substitutivity rule in accordance with Frege’s 
theory sometimes fails to preserve truth-value, There is the problem 
of quantifying simultaneously into a normal and an oblique context.
It is shown that Frege's theory lends a spurious precision to the 
question of the conditions under which indirect quotation can be said 
to be successful.
A truth theory meeting Tarski's criterion of adequacy is 
given for a simple Fregean language. It is argued that complex Fregean 
languages, ie. those which match the expressive power of natural lang­
uage, are not truth-theoretically tractable,
'The conclusion is drawn that an adequate theory must abjure
I
reference to intensional entities and meet the demands of truth theory, 
Quine's theory meets the first of these requirements: he counts express­
ions in indirect speech as without semantic significance. But it is 
shown that Quine dissolves the semantic structure needed by a theory 
of truth. Both of the requirements are met by the theories of Geach and 
Davidson, Geach argues that oratio obliqua is logically superfluous and 
can everywhere be replaced with oratio recta. The arguments advanced 
against quotations! theories prove to be fallacious. But Davidson's 
theory is prima facie more attractive than Geach's; for it counts oratio 
obliqua sentences as overtly exhibiting their logical form. Expressions 
in indirect speech play a normal semantical role: but are semantically
“ 3-
insulated from that to which we ascribe a truth-value. But it is shown 
that Davidson's theory as given is unable to deal with oratio obliqua 
sentences on their relational reading. In the last resort, Geach's 
theory seems the more viable of the two.
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INTRODUCTION
It is notorious that there is an apparent failure of extension- 
ality associated with oratio obliqua sentences. For such sentences 
appear to falsify the following rule: if an expression occurring in a 
sentence has a reference, then that expression can be replaced salva 
veritate by any other expression with the same reference. Thus we are 
unable to infer:
Dick said that Mary Ann Evans wrote Middlemarch
from
Dick said that George Eliot wrote Middlemarch
in spite of the fact that the names "Mary Ann Evans" and "George Eliot" 
refer to one and the same person. In addition, oratio obliqua sentences 
resist existential generalization, at least where a variable inside the 
scope of the indirect speech verb is bound by a quantifier outside of 
that scope. In view of the apparent failure of the substitutivity rule, 
the sentence;
( jx)( Dick said that x wrote Middlemarch )
is of dubious significance. The difficulty lies in specifying a domain 
over which the bound variable can be said to range,
'The apparent failure of the substitutivity rule and the 
difficulties which attend "quantifying in" are clearly different facets 
of the same problem: we do not know how the expressions which make up 
an oratio obliqua sentence contribute towards its truth-value. And it 
is to this problem that a theory of indirect discourse must primarily
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be addressed.
One can attempt to solve the problem by following Frege and 
thus introducing intensional entities as the references of expressions 
in indirect speech. The fundamental inadequacy of this approach to the 
problem is the theme of Chapters I and II of this essay. The third and 
final chapter consists of an investigation of three theories of indirect 
discourse, each of which is designed to avoid the difficulties inherent 
in the Fregean approach, 'The three ..theories considered ( under the head­
ing non-intensional ) are those put forward by Geach, Davidson and 
Quine,
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CHAFTER ONE
FREGE'S THEORY OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE
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By a thought I understand not the subjective performance of 
thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the 
common property of several thinkers.
FREGE
FREGE'S THEORY OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE
1, The Theory,
Frege has an explanation for the apparent failure of extensional- 
ity associated with oratio obliqua sentences. The substitutivity rule 
appears to break down when it is applied to the expressions occurring 
within the scope of an indirect speech verb, that is, in an oblique context, 
precisely because the rule is being incorrectly applied. In other words, 
Frege argues that pairs of expressions which have the same reference in 
normal contexts need not have the same reference in oblique contexts. And 
thus substitution of one for the other in an oblique context need not 
preserve the truth-value of the whole sentence.
Two principles are of fundamental importance within Fregean theory:
(a ) Truth-values are the references of sentences
and
(b ) The reference of an expression is determined by the reference 
of its components
It follows immediately from these two principles that the semantic role of 
an expression, that is, the contribution it makes towards the truth-value 
of the sentences in which it figures, is its reference. Now, Dummett has 
made the point that Frege models all relations of reference on the proto­
type of the relation between a name and its bearer. Thus, for Frege, to 
ask after the semantic role of an expression is to ask after the objective 
entity for which it stands. This leads to an excessively realistic concept­
ion of language whereby each expression is either a proper name or a
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functional expression, standing in the former case for an object and in 
the latter for a function. Moreover, Frege's doctrine of reference moulds 
his view of indirect discourse. If, what is clearly the case, the semantic 
role played by an expression in oratio obliqua is different from normal, 
then this can only be interpreted by Frege as implying that the expres­
sion stands for something in oratio obliqua other than its normal 
reference.
V/hat does an expression stand for in an oblique context? We can 
find out by asking after the reference of the whole content-sentence, 
that is, the complete sentence occurring within the scope of the indirect 
speech verb. Principle (a ) above dictates that such a sentence stand •'for 
its truth-value in normal contexts, JBut replacement of the content- 
sentence by another with the same truth-value will not in general pres­
erve the truth-value of the whole oratio obliqua sentence. However, the 
truth-value of the oratio obliqua sentence will be preserved (according 
to Frege) if the content-sentence being replaced and the sentence 
replacing it have the same sense ( ie, express the same thou^t ) in 
normal contexts. 'This leads Frege to conclude that the indirect reference 
of a sentence - its reference when it occurs in an oblique context - is 
nothing other than its ordinary sense.
The Fregean principle:
(C) The sense of an expression is compounded out of the senses 
of its components
taken together with principle (b) above, suggests that the proper names
and functional expressions which make up a content-sentence stand, in such
a contextjfor their ordinary senses, 'The same conclusion can be reached
from another direction: by considering that replacement of a proper name
or functional expression occurring in indirect speech by another with the
same ordinary sense will preserve the ordinary sense of the content-sentence 
and hence the truth-value of the whole oratio obliqua sentence. There is
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one more detail. If an expression in indirect speech does not have its 
ordinary reference, then, in view of the Fregean principle;
(d ) The sense of an expression determines its reference
it would appear not to have its ordinary sense in such a context either,
Frege concludes that an expression in indirect speech has an indirect 
sense,^
Frege's theory of indirect discourse amounts, therefore, to this.
When I say:
Dick said that George Eliot wrote Middlemarch
I am talking about the thought expressed by Dick's words; for my content- 
sentence refers to that thou^t. Thus the expression "said" which occurs 
in oratio obliqua is interpreted by Frege as standing for a function which 
maps a person and a thought ( here, Dick and the thou^t that George Eliot 
wrote Middlemarch ) onto a truth-value,
Thou^ts play a central role in the Fregean approach to indirect 
discourse. For an oratio obliqua sentence will have correctly reported 
someone's utterance just in case the content-sentence expresses ( in a 
normal context ) the same thought as that expressed by the original utterance, 
Frege conceives of the thou^t expressed by a sentence as a perfectly 
objective entity, in no way dependent for its existence upon the different 
sentences which may be used to give it expression. Just as the sense of a 
simple expression can be grasped by more than one speaker, so the thought 
expressed by a sentence can be apprehended by any number of different 
people. Thoughts are not, however, to be included among the transient 
entities which populate the material world, Frege argues^ that we must 
recognize a third realm, distinct from the subjective, inner world of ideas 
and the outer world of perceptible things. It is to this third realm that 
thoughts must be regarded as belonging. For thoughts, unlike the ideas of
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the inner world and the beer glasses and bottletops of the outer world, 
are timeless and unchangeable.
This notion of Frege's - that the sense expressed by a sentence 
is an eternal entity - derives from his conviction that the truth-value 
of a sentence cannot be relativized to features of the context in which it 
is uttered. Indeed, we have a tendency to speak of certain sentences, those 
containing token-reflexives, as if they were true under some circumstances 
and false under others. Thus, we would not look askance at someone who 
claimed that the sentence "It is raining" can be true at one time and false 
at another, Frege, however, cannot regard such a way of speaking as any­
thing other than highly misleading. Sentences containing token-reflexives 
obviously cannot be left out of an account of language. So Frege argues as 
follows: that to which truth and falsity are primarily ascribed is not a 
transient piece of language, a sentence, but a thou^t, A complete sentence 
( one which is used to make an assertion or to ask a sentential question ) 
expresses a thought as it stands. Other sentences express a thought by 
virtue of the senses of their component expressions and the linguistic 
context in which the sentence in question is uttered. Thus the sentence 
"She wrote Silas Namer" occurring in:
George Eliot wrote Middlemarch and she wrote Silas Marner
expresses a thought by virtue of being understood as elliptical for a sent­
ence which could be used to express a thought independently of linguistic 
context, viz., the complete sentence "George Eliot wrote Silas Marner", 
Sentences containing token-reflexives are different again; the thought 
expressed depends upon the non-linguistic context, Frege writes;
In all such cases the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is 
not the complete expression of the thought, but the knowledge 
of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as 
means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct 
apprehension.
Thus the thought expressed at a certain time and in a certain place by the
— 12—
sentence "It is raining" will be eternally true or false.
The success of oratio obliqua depends upon the content-sentence 
standing for the same thought as that expressed by the original utterance. 
But the thought for which the content-sentence stands may be determined by 
the context, linguistic or otherwise, in which the whole oratio obliqua 
sentence occurs. Thus the content-sentence may have to be understood as 
elliptical for a complete sentence, which stands ( in indirect speech ) 
for a thou^t independently of linguistic context. Then again, the 
content-sentence may contain a token-reflexive, as in
Dick said that it is raining
and thus the thou^t for which the content-sentence stands will be det­
ermined by the non-linguistic context ( in which the oratio obliqua 
sentence is uttered ), Problems of context obtrude upon indirect discourse, 
but one thing is clear: the thought for which the content-sentence stands 
is the pivot around which Frege's theory of indirect discourse revolves.
For, taking all the features of context into account, it will be perfectly 
determinate whether or not the original utterance being reported and the 
content-sentence of the oratio obliqua sentence bring the same thought 
into the proceedings.
The account of the theory is not quite complete, Frege nowhere 
appears to have discussed explicitly the case where an expression lies 
within the scope of two indirect speech verbs. The suggestion is, however, 
that an expression occurring in a doubly oblique context stands for the
sense it expresses in a singly oblique context. In other words, the doubly
indirect reference of an expression is its indirect sense. And the trebly
indirect reference of an expression is its doubly indirect sense. And so on.
Put quite generally; an expression occurring in a context oblique to the n^^ 
degree stands for the sense it expresses when it occurs in a context oblique 
to the n-1 degree.
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2. Indirect Sense,
Michael Dummett has mounted an attack upon Frege’s notion of indirect 
sense, 'Je have no idea at all what the indirect sense of an expression is, 
he argues, and thus we are unable to say what the doubly indirect refer­
ence of an expression happens to be. For the doubly indirect reference of 
an expression is its indirect sense. But if we do not know what the refer­
ence of an expression is in double oratio obliqua, then there is no saying 
( within Fregean theory ) how we judge the truth-value of sentences involv­
ing double oratio obliqua.
This is a powerful objection. Indeed, Dummett claims that it 
constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of the whole theory. However, he suggests 
that an emendation may be made to the theory, the objection thereby being 
dispelled. The emendation amounts to the replacement of principle (d) 
above by:
(D*) 'The reference of an expression is determined by its sense
and by the context in which it occurs.
With this emendation, there is no longer any need to argue that an expression 
must have an indirect sense in order to account for its indirect reference 
in oblique contexts. Each expression needs only one sense - its ordinary 
sense. This sense determines the expression to have its ordinary reference 
in normal contexts and its indirect reference in each and every oblique 
context. Thus the reference of an expression which occurs within the
scope of one or more indirect speech verbs coincides with its ordinary
sense,
Dummett's emendation effectively limits the Fregean approach to 
two semantic levels. For, according to the emended theory, an expression 
stands for its ordinary reference in normal contexts and for its ordinary 
sense in every oblique context. Consequently, expressions with the same 
ordinary sense will be everywhere intersubstitutable salva veritate ( and
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not, as in the unemended theory, just in normal and singly oblique cont­
exts ). Dummett writes;
This is intuitively reasonable: the replacements of an expression 
in double oratio obliqua which will leave the truth-value of the 
whole sentence unaltered are - just as in single oratio obliqua 
- those which have the same sense. The view that doubly indirect 
sense and reference must be distinguished from simply indirect 
sense and reference was a mechanical deduction from a slightly 
faulty theory.
It is not hard to show that Dummett*s emendation of Frege's theory 
is far from being intuitively reasonable. Let us assume that the expressions 
"a Greek" and "a Hellene" have the same ordinary sense. According to both 
the emended and the unamended theory, these two oratio obliqua sentences 
will have the same truth-value;
(1) Dick said that a Greek is a Hellene
and
(2) Dick said that a Greek is a Greek,
( It is a fundamental objection to Fregean theory in general that the 
theory will not allow sentences (1) and (2) to have different truth-values,
I defer consideration of this objection to the next section, however, since 
the present section is devoted to showing that Dummett's emended version
of Fregean theory is open to difficulties which are not faced by the
unemended theory, )
The Fregean principle (c) above forces Dummett to conclude that
(1) and (2) not only have the same truth-value but also express the same 
sense. For, on the emended theory, the sense expressed by "a Greek" and 
"a Hellene" is the same in all contexts, viz., their ordinary sense.
Thus, for Dummett, the replacement of an expression in an oblique context 
by another with the same reference will not only preserve the truth-value 
of the whole; it will also preserve the sense of the whole, Dummett must 
therefore accept the following equivalence:
(3) The thou^.t that Dick said that a Greek is a Hellene =
The thought that Dick said that a Greek is a Greek.
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The proponent of the unemended theory need not, of course, accept 
(3). He is not committed (as Dummett is committed) to the view that pres­
ervation of reference in oratio obliqua necessarily results in preservation 
of sense. Thus he can argue that substitution of ’.’a Greek" for "a-Hellene" 
in (1) to get (2) amounts to nothing more than preservation of reference 
( ie. truth-value ), For the expressions in question, despite having the 
same indirect reference ( ie, ordinary sense ), need not have the same 
indirect sense.
It is thus perfecly compatible with the unemended theory to hold 
that the following sentences are both true;
(4) Anthony believes that Dick said that a Greek is a Hellene,
and
(5) It is not the case that Anthony believes that Dick said that 
a Greek is a Greek,
Not so for Dummett's emended theory. The upholder of this simplified 
version of Frege's theory is compelled, by virtue of his commitment to
(3), to hold that the conjunction of (4) and (5) is a contradiction.For 
he is forced to count the conjunction of (4) and (5) as expressing the 
same thought as;
(6) Anthony believes that Dick said that a Greek is a Greek and 
it is not the case that Anthony believes that Dick said that 
a Greek is a Greek.
(4) and (5); of course, do not appear to contradict one another
even on the supposition that "a Greek" and "a Hellene" have the same
ordinary sense; to this extent pure Fregean theory is much more plausible 
than the emended theory.
There is another point. Dummett's insistence that sense and refer­
ence coincide in oratio obliqua obliges him to embrace the view that it
is impossible to make genuine mistakes about the identity of the senses
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of expressions. For, within Fregean theory at large, identity-statements 
are only informative ( and thus one can only make genuine mistakes about 
whether they are true or false ) to the extent that the co-referring 
expressions which flank the identity-sign express different senses. 'Jhere 
the flanking expressions express the same sense, it will be impossible to 
understand the identity-statement without recognizing immediately that it 
is true. Thus Dummett must hold that expressions which stand for the 
same reference in an oblique context do so in a perfectly revealing way; 
for he has committed himself to the view that such expressions necessarily 
express the same sense. This is not a plausible view. One can imagine a 
situation in which a person knows what the indirect reference of each one 
of a pair of sentences is ( ie. he knows for each sentence what thought it 
expresses in normal contexts ) and yet he is genuinely perplexed as to 
whether the two sentences stand for the same indirect reference, Frege 
can, of course, account for such a situation by invoking the notion of 
indirect sense; two sentences may stand for the same indirect reference 
and yet express different indirect senses.
In conclusion: Dummett's emendation is not only out of harmony 
with Frege's other views but also gives rise to difficulties in its own 
right. However, Dummett's crushing objection to the original theory still 
stands: that we do not know what the indirect sense of an expression is 
and, as a consequence, the semantic role played by expressions in double 
oratio obliqua is wholly mysterious.
3. The Greek Counterexample.
One would expect an adequate theory of indirect discourse to 
accommodate the fact that (1) and (2) above can diverge in truth-value.
For Dick may have said that a Greek is a Hellene: but it does not follow 
that Dick had therby been boring enough to say that a Greek is a Greek.
As nointed out in the previous section, Frege's theory of indirect discourse
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conspicuously fails to accommodate this fact; since (2) is got from (l) 
by a legitimate application of the substitutivity rule, the theory predicts 
that truth-value must be preserved. This counterexample to Frege’s theory 
is henceforth called the Greek counterexample.
One way out for the committed Fregean would be to declare that no 
two distinct expressions belonging to the same language could ever have 
the same sense. In that case, "a Greek" and "a Hellene" would no longer 
stand for the same indirect reference, and thus the substitution of the 
former for the latter in (1) to get (2) need not be regarded within Fregean 
theory as necessarily preserving truth-value.
The Greek counterexample would be avoided by such a move; but at 
much too high a price. For it could no longer be allowed within Fregean 
theory that distinct sentences ( ie. sentence-types ) in the same language 
could ever express the same thought, since the replacement of an expression 
within a sentence by a distinct expression would never preserve the sense 
of the whole. But if the same thou^t could never be given expression by 
two distinct sentences belonging to the same language, then the constraints 
laid by Fregean theory upon indirect quotation within a language ( ie, 
where the oratio obliqua sentence and the utterance being reported belonged 
to the same language ) would become, to say the very least, rather severe. 
Under such circumstances, the content-sentence of a true oratio obliqua 
sentence and the utterance being reported would have to be identical. In 
other words, one would only be able to report in English the words of 
another English speaker by repeating those words, v/here the content-sentence 
and the utterance being reported were distinct sentences, there would be no 
question of the same thought being brought into the proceedings.
À theory of indirect discourse which placed constraints of this 
kind upon reporting within a language could, not be correct. For we know 
that successful indirect quotation within a language need not depend upon 
the repetition of the utterance being reported. To think that indirect 
quotation does depend upon repetition is to confuse oratio obliqua with
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oratio recta.
It might be argued that Frege’s theory of indirect discourse 
could be emended so as to accommodate both the fact that reporting need not 
depend upon repetition and the doctrine that distinct sentences dra^ wn from 
the same language can never be said to express exactly the same thou^t. 
Such an emendation would amount to giving up the principle that successful 
indirect quotation involves the expression of a common thought by the 
original utterance and the content-sentence^ Frege's theory of indirect 
discourse would, as a consequence, say something like this: an oratio 
obliqua sentence will have correctly reported someone's utterance just in 
case the content-sentence of that oratio obliqua sentence and the utterance 
being reported express related thoughts.
Such a theory of indirect discourse would have little explanatory 
value. The task which any theory of indirect discourse must accomplish is 
that of explaining the relationship between the content-sentence and the 
original utterance. Now the theory put forward by Frege, whatever its other 
faults, says something very definite about this relationship; according 
to the theory, the content-sentence and the original utterance are related 
insofar as there exists an extralingistic entity to which both give expres­
sion. To say, as the emended version of Frege’s theory described above does 
say, that the content-sentence and the original utterance are related 
insofar as they expiess related extralinguistic entities, is not to say 
very much about the relationship between the two sentences: it is merely 
to shift the difficulty up to the level of thoughts.
Frege himself certainly did not subscribe to the doctrine that no 
two distinct sentences belonging to the same language can ever be said to 
express the same thought. He writes:
If all transformation of the expression were forbidden on the plea 
that this would alter the content as well, logic would simply be 
crippled; for the task of logic can hardly be performed without 
trying to recognize the thought in its manifold guises, goreover, 
all definitions would then have to be rejected as false.
“ 19-
It is thus very much a part of Fregean theory that distinct sentences 
drawn from the same language can express exactly the same thought. Again, 
it is very much a part of the theory that distinct subsentential expres­
sions can share the same sense: that is, they can make exactly the same 
contribution towards the determination of the truth-value of sentences in 
which they occur. Even if it were the case that no two distinct expressions 
happened to have the same sense, one could invent an expression and stipulate 
that it have the same sense as an existing expression. The Greek counter­
example would then arise anew.
Another way to get around the Greek counterexample would be to 
accept that "a Greek" and "a Hellene" have the same ordinary sense, but to 
deny that the content-sentence of (l) and (2), viz, "a Greek is a Hellene" 
and "a Greek is a Greek", express the same thou^t ( in normal contexts ), 
There would then be no need for the Fregean to regard (l) and (2) as neces­
sarily agreeing in truth-value: for their respective content-sentences 
would differ in indirect reference. However, some such principle as the
9
following, suggested by Putnam , would have to be adopted, in order to exp­
lain how it is that two sentences whose primitive constituents correspond 
pointwise in sense can express different thoughts.
(P) The sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts 
and of its logical structure.
Thus the content-sentences of (l) and (2) would have to be regarded as
having a different logical structure. For, according to Putnam:
Two sentences are said to have the same logical structure, when 
occurrences of the same sig^^in one correspond to occurrences of 
the same sign in the other.
It cannot be said that Frege ignored the connection between the 
structure of a sentence and the thought expressed by that sentence. Dummett 
argues most plausibly^‘ that the Fregean principle (c) above suggests 
rather more than that the sense of a complex expression, including a
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se.ntsnce, is determined by the senses of its components. The words 
"compounded out of" appear to suggest that the sense of a sentence can 
only be understood as the the sense of a complex which is constructed 
from its parts in exactly the same way as that sentence. In other words, 
sentences which express the same sense must have exactly the same struc­
ture, Now, the notion of sructure appealed to must not be understood as 
applying too readily to the surface structure of the sentence; for 
distinct sentences drawn from different languages may have quite differ­
ent surface structures and yet express exactly the same sense, Dummett 
suggests that we are concerned here with what Chomsky and his followers 
call "deep structure",
Putnam's notion of the "logical structure" of a sentence is 
clearly quite unlike the notion of semantic structure attributed to 
Frege, For Putnam's notion turns upon the surface features of the 
sentence. Thus the content-sentences of (l) and (2) are to be regarded 
as having a different logical structure precisely because the content- 
sentence of (2), unlike that of (1), has the same expression flanking 
the "is".
Now, there are reasons for thinking that a Fregean theory of 
indirect discourse incorporating Putnam's principle (P) would itself 
fall victim to a variant of the Greek counterexample. For it is fully 
in accordance with principle (P) to hold that the content-sentences of:
(7) Dick said explicitly that a Greek is a Greek
and
(8) Dick said explicitly that a Hellene is a Hellene
stand for the same indirect reference ( ie. express the same thought in 
normal contexts ), The two content-sentences agree pointwise in sense 
and ( in Putnam's books ) exhibit the same logical structure. The 
proponents of a Fregean theory incorporating principle (P) would
—21 —
therefore be committed to the view that (?) and (s) necessarily have 
the same truth-value. However, one can imagine a situation in which (?) 
were true and (8) false: namely, that in which Dick utters the sentence 
"A Greek is a Greek",
It may be argued against this last claim that (7) and (8) are 
not genuine oratio obliqua sentences at all: they are disguised oratio 
recta sentences. Thus (?) is equivalent to:
(9) Dick said "A Greek is a Greek" 
and (8) is equivalent to:
(10) Dick said "A Hellene is a Hellene"
Seen in this light, the divergence in truth-value of (7) and (8) under 
those circumstances in which Dick utters the sentence "A Greek is a 
Greek" in no way damages a Fregean theory of indirect discourse incor­
porating principle (P).
In answer to this objection: it seems to me that (7) and (8) 
are genuine oratio obliqua sentences and thus in no v^ay equivalent to 
the oratio recta sentences,(9) and (10) respectively. It is easily seen
that (7) and (9) are in no way equivalent. Let us imagine that Dick
utters the French sentence "Un Grec, c’est un Grec", Under such circ­
umstances, (7) would be true and (9) would be false, A similar argument 
shows (s) and (IO) to be non-equivalent.
One is irresistibly drawn towards the conclusion that Frege's 
theory of indirect discourse ultimately falls prey to the Greek counter­
example, V/hat this points to is that the theory is unable to accommod­
ate those examples of oratio oblinua, like (1), (2), (7) and (S), which 
bear a close resemblance to ( without being identical with ) oratio 
recta. There is a very strong presumption in such cases that the words 
uttered by the original speaker and the words which actually appear in 
the content-sentence are almost the same.
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4. Quantifying into Oblique Contexts
It was said earlier that quantified oratio obliqua sentences
such as;
O x )  ( Dick said that x wrote Middlemarch ) 
are of dubious significance. For it is seemingly impossible to specify 
the domain over which the bound variable ranges. Such difficulties 
are apparently dispelled within the framework of Frege's theory of 
indirect discourse; the bound variable can be regarded as ranging over 
the senses of proper names.
Serious problems arise, however, over sentences like "Dick 
called the author of Middlemarch a genius". The surface appearance of 
such a sentence belies its actual structure: for it must be analysed as 
"Dick said, of the author of Middlemarch. that she was a genius". And 
this comes out in quantifinational notation as "(3 x) ( x is the author 
of Middlemarch and Dick said that x was a genius )". Here is the 
difficulty; the single bound variable occurs both within the normal part 
of the sentence and within the oblique part, but it is senseless to 
suppose rthat it ranges simultaneously over two distinct domains.
There are other sentences which pose the same problem, Frege's 
theory appears to dictate that we regard the proper name "George Eliot" 
in "Dick said ri^tly that George Eliot was a genius" as standing 
simultaneously for a person and a sense. For the sentence must be anal­
ysed as;
(11) Georgs Eliot was a genius and Dick said that Geonrge 
Eliot was a genius
in which the proper name "George Eliot" occurs twice; once in the 
normal part of the sentence and once in the oblique part. The exist­
ential generalization of (11), viz.,
(12) ( 3 x) ( X was a genius and Dick said that x was a genius )
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is hence impossible to interpret; for the bound variable, quite obvi­
ously, cannot have two different values at the same time.
Dummett attempts to overcome the problem - of having to quant­
ify simultaneously into an oblique and a normal context - within the 
framework of Fregean theory. He suggests that the existential 
generalization of sentences like (11) involves quantifying consistently 
an oblique context; and thus the first conjunct is to be interpreted 
as standing for the thou^t it expresses in normal contexts. He writes:
... the effect of the disguised opacity of the context [is] 
undone ... by the tacit application to the whole of a single 
operation mapping sense on to reference. Such an operation 
mi^t be expressed by "It is true that ..." ( without any 
presumption that this phrase is always to be thou^t of as 
inducing an opaque context ), construed as converting any 
expression standing for a thou^t into one standing for the 
corresponding truth-value.
As a consequence of Dummett *s suggestion, the bound variable 
in (12) can be taken as ranging uninterruptedly over the senses of 
proper names. For the proper name "George Eliot" occurring in Dummett's 
proposed analysis of (II), viz.,
(13) It is true that George Eliot was a genius and Dick said 
that George Eliot was a genius
stands in both of its occurrences for its sense,
Dummett*s proposal looks very much like an ad hoc manoeuvre, 
designed merely to render compatible at all costs Frege's theory of 
indirect discourse and existential generalization. What justification 
is there, other than enabling quantification to proceed into a single 
context, for suddenly taking an apparently normal context to be oblique? 
There is a further problems it is not exactly clear what Dummett*s 
proposal amounts to.
At first glance, he appears to be recommending that we see the 
first conjunct of (II) as governed tacitly by the oblique context -
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creating operator "It is true that This interpretation is backed
up by his comment ( quoted above ) that we must not presume that the 
operator is always to be thought of as inducing an oblique context.
The implication is that in this case the operator does induce an oblique 
context,
Dummett*s other comments, however, throw doubt upon this inter­
pretation, In his discussion of the operator, Dummett adds the proviso 
that the scope of the first "that" in a sentence like (13) ( as analysis 
of (11) ) does not extend over the conjunction. This proviso superfici­
ally appears to be necessary. If the scope of the operator "It is true 
that ,,. " ( interpreted as inducing an oblique context ) were the 
whole of (11), then the content-sentence within the scope of "Dick 
said that" would be thrown into a doubly oblique context; but, in that 
case, the bound variable of (12) would have to be taken as ranging 
simultaneously over ordinary and indirect senses. However, such a 
proviso restricting the scope of the operator is superfluous in view 
of Dummett's insistence earlier that expressions stand for their 
ordinary senses in double oratio obliqua,
Why does Dummett make the proviso? The implication is that the 
operator has an effect on the first content-sentence which must not 
be transmitted to the second content-sentence ( within the scope of 
"Dick said that" ), And this reading is backed up by Dummett's 
comment ( also quoted above ) that the effect of the first conjunct 
of (11) being in a disguised oblique context is undone by the applicat­
ion of the operator. On this reading, "It is true that ,.,",far from 
inducing an oblique context, actually removes one. This is the point 
of Dummett'3 remark that the operation in question converts any 
expression standing for a thought into one standing for the corresp­
onding truth-value. For this is an operation we do not want applied 
to the second content-sentence.
“ 25-
It IS not hard to see why Lummett makes the operator "It is 
true that play an ambiguous role. Were the operator to induce an
oblique context, Frege's thesis that the references of our words are 
what we talk about would force us to regard someone who uttered (11) 
as having spoken of the sense of the name "George Eliot", rather than 
of George Eliot herself. On the other hand, removal of an antecedently 
existing oblique context would permit the problem of quantifying 
simultaneously into an oblique and a normal context to arise again, 
Dumraett wants to have the best of both worlds: he wants sentence (11) 
to be about George Eliot and he wants the bound variable of sentence
(12) to range consistently over senses,
5. Indirect Discourse and The Preservation of 
Sense,
The introduction of intensional entities - ie, senses - into 
the realm of reference in order to preserve the extensionality of a 
language containing the oratio obliqua construction has proved not to 
be unproblematic. Any lingering doubts over the value of Frege's theory 
of indirect discourse ought to be dispelled by the following consider­
ation: there is no saying in advance how far the content-sentence of 
an oratio obliqua sentence may be permitted to deviate from direct 
quotation. This contradicts the central tenet of Frege's theory: that 
the content-sentence can deviate from direct quotation only so long as 
it still express ( in a normal context )the same thought as that 
expressed by the directly quoted sentence.
It is being claimed against Frege that the content-sentence and 
the sentence uttered by the speaker being reported need not have the 
same meaning. In other words, the content-sentence can often be
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replaced by a sentence with a different meaning and yet the containing 
oratio obliqua sentence continue to report correctly what the original 
speaker said.
The proponents of Frege’s theory may respond to this criticism
by pointing out that Frege did not commit himself to the view that
the content-sentence and the original utterance must be synonymous:
only that they must express the same thought. For Frege regarded the
meaning of a sentence as distinguishable into at least two elements - 
1 %
sense and tone. The tone is that part of the meaning of a sentence 
which is quite irrelevant to the determination of its truth-value. 
Hence, Fregean theory allows that two sentences may express the same 
thought - ie. have the same truth-conditions - and yet fail to have 
the same meaning. To the extent to which the content-sentence and the 
original utterance may differ in tone, to that extent they may be 
permitted to differ in meaning.
Such a response from those who support Frege’s theory would be 
to no avail. Frege himself regarded the sense of a sentence as by far 
the most important aspect of its meaning; and thus it is not a serious 
distortion of Frege's position to ascribe to him the view that the 
content-sentence and the original utterance must, if the oratio obliqua 
sentence is to report correctly what the original speaker said, be 
synonymous. Nonetheless, the case against Frege need not rest upon this 
point alone. His doctrine that the content-sentence and the original 
utterance must express the same thought severely restricts the scope 
of indirect quotation. For it is undoubtedly the case that the content- 
sentence of a true oratio oblicua sentence need not have the same 
truth-conditions as the utterance it serves to report.
Those who look kindly upon Frege’s theory of indirect discourse
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will find this last point implausible. One imagines them replying as 
follows. The content-sentence of a true oratio obliqua sentence must 
have the same truth-conditions as the utterance being reported, 
appearances to the contrary. Where the content-sentence and the original 
utterance do not appear to express the same thought, one can only 
conclude that either sentence is a context-sensitive sentence ( in 
Fregean terms ) which is being taken out of context. In other words, 
either the content-sentence or the original utterance must be read as 
elliptical for a complete sentence which expresses a thou^t independ­
ently of the surrounding linguistic context; or it must contain a 
token-reflexive, in which case the thought expressed will be determined 
by the non-linguistic context. The imaginary spokesman for Fregean 
theory will then point out that it is only by ignoring the context 
within which the content-sentence or the original utterance appears 
that one can seemingly substantiate the thesis that there need be no one 
thought to which both give expression. Once sufficient attention is 
paid to the (linguistic or non-linguistic) context within which the 
oratio obliqua sentence or the sentence being reported is uttered, 
one will discover that the same thought is being brought into the 
proceedings.
This reply from the Fregean is inadequate. For the thesis that 
the content-sentence and the original utterance need not have the same 
truth-conditions in no way depends for its credibility upon taking 
context-sensitive sentences out of context. The best way to bring this 
point out is to look at an example. James, a member of a small Philos­
ophy department comprising only twenty people, says to a colleague 
( and here discourse is direct ) "The only people at Geach's party 
will be the members of the Philosophy Department". Mow, James* colleague.
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upon uttering this oratio oblicua sentence:
(14) James said that no more than twenty people will be at 
Geach's party
will have said something true. Let us catalogue the interesting features 
of this piece of indirect discourse. First of all, the content-sentence 
of the oratio oblicua sentence (14) and James' original utterance do not 
have the same truth-conditions. In Fregean language: they express differ­
ent thoughts. For one can imagine a situation in which the content- 
sentence "No more than twenty people will be at Geach's party" were true 
and in which James' utterance "The only people at Geach's party will be 
the members of the Philosophy Department" were false. Secondly, neither 
the content-sentence nor James* utterance are context-sensitive in 
Fregean terms. In other words, both sentences are complete: they express 
thoughts independently of linguistic context. Furthermore, the thoughts 
expressed cannot be said to be determined by the non-linguistic context, 
for neither sentence contains any token-reflexive expressions. Thus the 
Fregean cannot explain away this piece of indirect discourse by adopting 
the view that features of the surrounding linguistic or non-linguistic 
context determine the content-sentence and James' utterance to express 
the same thought.
Dummett is undismayed by this feature of indirect discourse: 
that the content-sentence of a true oratio obliqua sentence need not 
preserve the sense of the utterance being reported. He claims that a 
true oratio obliqua sentence which fails to preserve the sense of the 
original utterance suceeds in reporting what the original speaker said 
by virtue of being uttered within a certain type of context. This context 
comprising background truths well known to all parties - contributes 
towards the accuracy of the report not by determining the content-
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sentence and the original utterance to express the same thou^t; but 
by ensuring that the import of the content-sentence reflects that of 
the original utterance. Dummett writes:
The canon of strict preservation of sense is an ideal to which 
we often do not make the effort to conform, an ideal to which 
in the context we are not taken to be striving strictly to 
conform. It does not follow from this fact that there is no 
such ideal, that there is no standard by which we can jud^ 
indirect quotation as true or false au nied de la lettre.
According to Dummett, therefore,
(15) James said that the only people at Geach's party will be 
the members of the Philosophy Department
is, strictly speaking, a more accurate report of what James said than
(14). For, (15)» unlike (14), fulfils the ideal of the strict preserv­
ation of sense.
It seems to me that Dummett is quite wrong; that (14) is no 
less accurate a report of what James said than (15). To think other­
wise is to regard (15) ais commensurate with the oratio recta sentence:
(16) James said "The only people at Geach's party will be the 
members of the Philosophy Department"
Here the ideal to which we make the effort to conform is the reproduct­
ion within quotation marks of James' actual sentence. The standards of 
accuracy to which we seek to conform when reporting in oratio obliqua 
are by no means of such a fixed and clearcut character. What counts as 
a correct report may depend upon our reasons for quoting. Again, we 
may tailor our content-sentence so as to maximise the comprehension 
of our audience. The point is that Dummett's contention - that the 
preservation of the sense of the original speaker' utterance, while
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^ sine qua non of correct reporting, constitutes a methodological 
ideal - flies in the face of our actual practise. We give no priority 
of place to oratio obliqua sentences which preserve through their 
content-sentences the sense of the original speaker's utterance. When 
challenged as to the accuracy of our indirect quotation, we revert, in 
the last resort, to oratio recta.
6. Indirect Discourse and Translation
It has been argued by Quine^ ^ and echoed by Davidson^^ that 
there are evident affinities between indirect quotation and transl­
ation. This contention does not reflect any disinclination on their 
part to accept the thesis so heavily stressed in the previous section: 
that the content-sentence of indirect discourse and the utterance 
being reported need not be synonymous. Indeed it is to account for 
this latter feature of indirect quotation that Davidson draws 
parallels between the communication of what another has said through 
oratio obliqua and throu^ translation. For Davidson cleaves to ( a 
version of ) Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. It 
then becomes possible for Davidson to hold both that the content-
sentence is a translation of the original utterance and that the two
17sentences need not be synonymous.
Quine describes his indeterminacy thesis thus:
.., rival systems of analytical hypotheses can conform to all 
speech dispositions within each of the languages concerned and 
yet dictate, in countless cases, utterly disparate translations; 
not mere mutual paraphrases, but translations each of which 
would be excluded by the other system^ of translation. Two such 
translations might even be patently contrary in truth-value, 
provided t^gre is no stimulation that would encourage assent 
to either.
Thus Quine is saying more than that there is no unique, objective
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criterion for the correctness of translation. He is arguing that two 
equally acceptable theories of translation - acceptable to the extent 
that they fit the behavioural data ( and, as Davidson would say, 
insofar as they enable the translator to ascribe to the speaker under 
scrutiny a coherent set of prepositional attitudes about the world )
- may map one sentence onto two sentences with different truth-values.
Let us suppose for the moment that the content-sentence of a 
true oratio obliqua sentence ought -to be viewed as a translation of the 
original utterance. Then it is clear that the thesis of the indeterm­
inacy of translation, at least in the form in which Quine advances it, 
takes us much further than we want to go. The purpose of the previous 
section was to show that a single utterance can be reported correctly 
by two oratio obliqua sentences with non-synonymous content-sentences. 
This is not to countenance the possiblity that those content-sentences 
can be incompatible to the extent of disagreeing in truth value outside 
of the oratio obliqua construction. And it is this latter possibility, 
not its more innocuous precursor, which hinges upon the truth of Quine's 
indeterminacy thesis.
One could adopt a weaker form of the indeterminacy thesis.
But a far better course would be to give up the notion that the relation­
ship between the content-sentence of a true oratio obliqua sentence 
and the utterance it serves to report can usefully be viewed as 
specifically akin to the relationship between sentences which translate 
one another. For the use ( in Davidsonian fashion ) of the indeterminacy 
thesis to prop up the doctrine that indirect quotation need not preserve 
meaning is an enterprise which promises little reward. Quine's indet­
erminacy thesis is relatively contentious and we would wish the 
doctrine that indirect quotation need not preserve meaning to survive 
its rejection.
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The question as to whether the indeterminacy thesis is true or 
false assumes a much greater importance for those who support Frege's 
theory of indirect discourse. Within Fregean theory, one sentence 
translates another just in case both express the same thought, and 
thus translation and indirect quotation are kindred activities. In 
view oi Frege's insistence that thoughts be viewed as objective and 
fully determinate, those who adhere to Fregean theory would appear to 
be committed to the view that there is a unique, objective criterion for 
the correctness of translation. And this is precisely what Quine 
denies. According to his indeterminacy thesis, there is no sense in 
asking which of a number of incompatible translations of a sentence 
is the correct one once it has been ascertained that the translation 
theories in question are supported by the available evidence. Indeed, 
Davidson argues explicitly from the indeterminacy of translation to 
the rejection of a theory of indirect discourse which introduces 
intensional entities into the realm of reference.
Dummett suggests, however, that Fregean theory can accommod-
19ate indeterminacy of translation. Wnat we have to do is relativise 
the sense expressed by a sentence to a system of analytical hypoth­
eses, In order to support this contention, Dummett suggests that an 
account o!' sense is a theoretical model which must square with 
observable linguistic behaviour. If this is the case, then there is no 
good reason for- supposing that more than one such model should not 
agree with all the linguistic evidence. Indeterminacy of translation 
is now safely in hand: for incompatible translations of a sentence, 
each one correct relative to an acceptable system of analytical 
hypotheses or translation theory, will correspond to. different workable 
models. It will still be determinate whether or not two sentences
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express the same thought and hence have the same truth-conditions, 
but in each case relative to a given system of analytical hypotheses. 
The accommodation of the indeterminacy thesis within Fregean 
theory has, however, an enfeebling effect upon Frege's theory of ind­
irect discourse. According to the theory of indirect discourse which 
emerges from the re-interpretation of Fregean theory outlined in the 
previous paragaph, there must be an acceptable system of analytical 
hypotheses relative to which the content-sentence of a true oratio 
obliqua sentence and the utterance being reported express the same 
thought. But that is to say no more than that the content-sentence 
must translate the original utterance relative to an acceptable 
translation theory. The notion of two sentences expressing a common 
thought has been made to depend upon the notion of their translating 
one another, rather than vice versa. In other words, the notion of an 
objective timeless and independent thought common to the content- 
sentence and the original utterance, and by virtue of which the one 
can be said to report the other, no longer does any work. It has 
become an idle cog in the machinery of the theory. One suspects that 
the theory of indirect discourse which remains, a Fregean theory 
dispossessed of its central feature and dependent upon the notion of 
translation, has little power to enlighten.
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CÏÏAPTER TMO
FREGEAN LANGUAGES AND TRUTH THEORY
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It might be thought, and perhaps often is, that if we are 
willing to welcome intensional entities without stint - properties, 
propositions, individual concepts, and whatever else - then no 
further difficulties stand in the way of giving ah account of the 
logical form of sentences in oratio obliqua. This is not so. 
Neither the languages Frege suggests as models for natural lang­
uages nor the language described by Church are amenable to theory 
in the sense of a truth-definition meeting Tarski's standards.
DAVIDSON.
FREGEAN LANGUAGES AND TRUTH THEORY
1. Fregean Languages and the Finiteness Demand,
An infinite number of sentences can be generated from the finite 
vocabulary of a natural language. A satisfactory theory of meaning for a
language must yield an account of the meaning of every sentence. In this
2
essay I assume the truth of the thesis that such a theory of meaning is 
provided by recursively characterizing a truth-predicate in Tarski’s 
fashion for the language in question. The resulting theory of truth is 
adequate just in case it entails a true biconditional of the form; 
s. is true iff p
for each and every sentence of the object-language, where a structural 
description of the sentence in question replaces "s"; and a sentence in 
the metalanguage replaces "p" subject to this condition: that it be true 
in the metalanguage if and only if s is true in the object-language. A 
theory of truth which meets this criterion of adequacy - Tarski's 
Convention T - is an adequate theory of meaning.. The biconditionals ( or 
T-sentences ) entailed by the theory give an account of the truth conditions 
of every sentence in the language : but in so doing they also furnish a 
statement of what each sentence means.
The biconditionals themselves do not show how the meaning of each 
sentence in the language depends upon its structure. Rather, the semantic
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structure of each sentence is revealed by the proof of the relevant 
T-sentence, In other words, the statement of the meaning of a sentence 
must be deduced from a finite number of axioms assigning semantical 
properties to its parts. The finiteness of a truth theory is not merely a 
technical requirement, A finite theory of truth is designed to uncover a 
structure in the language that mirrors the mysterious competence possessed 
by speakers of the language: that of being able to understand quite unfamiliar 
sentences through familiarity with their parts. If there is no way of giving 
for every sentence of the language a finite proof that its meaning is a 
function of the meaning of its parts, then we have a very compelling reason
for supposing the language to be unleamable in principle,^
It is thus a fundamental demand to make upon a language that it be
amenable to the recursive characterization of a truth-predicate. And it is 
a demand which complex languages built on the Fregean model conspicuously 
fail to meet.
In his paper "On Sense and Reference"^, Frege suggests in effect 
that the expressions of a natural language are systematically ambiguous, 
each such expression standing for its direct reference in normal linguistic 
contexts and for its indirect reference in oblique contexts. The details 
of his theory of indirect discourse will be excessively familiar from 
Chapter I; suffice it to say that an expression occurring within an oblique 
context stands for its ordinary sense and expresses an indirect sense.
For Frege, each expression belonging to a language is either a 
proper name or a functional expression. Proper names are complete expressions 
which stand for complete entities, viz. objects. And functional expressions 
are incomplete expressions which stand for correspondingly incomplete 
entities, viz. functions. Thus a one-place functional expression stands for 
a function of one argument; a two—place functional expression stands for 
a function of two arguments; and so on. Now, a complex proper name must 
contain at least one functional expression into the argument-places of 
which have been inserted proper names ( where the functional expression
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being completed is of first level ) or functional expressions of first 
level ( where the functional expression being completed is of second 
level ). And ( according to Frege ) the reference of the complex proper 
name so formed will be the value of the function referred to by the funct­
ional expression being completed - for the references of the proper names 
or functional expressions inserted into the argument-places of that funct­
ional expression as arguments. Frege maintains, moreover, that the value 
of a function is always an object, never a function. Consequently, 
incomplete expressions always yield, when their argument-places are filled, 
proper names, never expressions that remain incomplete.
Familiar parts of language are treated by Fregean theory in the 
following fashion. A predicate emerges as a one-place functional expression 
yielding, when its argument-place is filled, a special sort of complex 
proper name, viz, a sentence. The reference of a predicate is therefore a 
function which maps the reference of a proper name onto the reference of 
the sentence formed by inserting that proper name into the argument-place 
of the predicate, ( The reference of a relational expression is accordingly 
a function which maps the references of two or more proper names onto the 
reference of a sentence. ) Frege takes the reference of a sentence to be 
one of two objects, the True or the False. Hence, the reference of a 
predicate is a function whose value is always a truth-value.^ For example, 
in the sentence;
Socrates sits
the predicate " % sits" stands for a funtion which maps the reference of the 
proper name "Socrates", viz. Socrates himself, onto the truth-value of the 
whole sentence, (A quantifier emerges as a predicate of second level, having 
a single argument-place to be filled by a predicate of first—level. Thus a 
quantifier stands for a second-level function which maps a first-level 
function onto the truth-value of a sentence, )
In his last published paper "Compound Thoughts"^, Frege insists 
that the sense of an incomplete expression is also incomplete. This suggests
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that he regards the sense of a functional expression as a function, though
not the same function as its reference. Thus, in the sentence displayed
above, the sense of the predicate '* s sits'* would be a function which mapped 
the sense of the name "Socrates" onto the sense of the whole sentence: this 
being the thou^t that Socrates sits.
In view of Frege's doctrine that the reference of an expression 
in an oblique context is its ordinary sense, it would appear to be the case 
that the reference of a functional expression in an oblique context is that 
function which constitutes its sense in normal contexts.^ Following this 
line of thought, the reference of " % sits" in:
Theaetetus says that Socrates sits
would be a function which mapped the indirect reference of "Socrates", viz, 
the ordinary sense of "Socrates", onto the indirect reference of the cont­
aining sentence "Socrates sits": this being the thought that Socrates sits.
It is natural to suppose, moreover, that the indirect sense of a functional 
expression ( ie. its sense in oblique contexts ) is yet another function - 
a function which maps the indirect senses of proper names onto (indirect) 
thoughts.
It was pointed out in Chapter I that Frege nowhere appears to have 
discussed explicitly the semantical behaviour of expressions occurring 
within the scope of more than one indirect speech verb. However, it was 
supposed that the following rule constitutes a natural extension of the model 
of language outlined by Frege in " On Sense and Reference". An expression 
occurring in a context oblique to the n^" degree stands for the sense it 
expresses when it occurs in a context oblique to the n-1^^ degree. In 
combination with Frege's views on functional expressions, the rule suggests 
that the reference of a functional expression in a context oblique to the
degree is that function which constitutes its sense in a context oblique
to the n-1^^ degree.
The model of language outlined by Frege in "On Sense and Reference"
- 39-
appears to have been conceived as an informal model, designed to deal with 
the vagaries of natural language. That Frege had in mind a more formal theory 
for a logically more regimented language is suggested by the following extr­
act from a letter he wrote to Russell;
Strictly speaking, to avoid ambiguity, in indirect speech one must 
use special signs, the connections of which with the corresponding 
signs of direct speech are transparent.
( 23 December 1902 )
In other words, we use new expressions in singly oblique contexts, expr­
essions that stand for the senses of the proper names and functional 
expressions used in direct speech. Presumably, more new expressions are 
used in doubly oblique contexts to stand for the senses of the expressions 
used in singly oblique contexts. And so on. For each step up the semantic 
ladder an entire set of new semantically primitive expressions is 
introduced into the vocabulary of the language. ( Church adopts this more 
formal approach in his paper "A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and 
Denotations.^ )
We can now return to the original claim; that complex languages 
built on the Fregean model are not accessible to a truth theory meeting 
Tarski's Convention T. The expressions of a natural language can be used 
within the scope of an arbitrarily long string of indirect speech verbs.
In order to match the expressive power of natural language, a Fregean 
language must permit the formation of sentences containing oblique contexts 
of arbitrarily high degree. It follows that each one of the finitely many 
expressions belonging to the vocabulary of a Fregean language built on the 
informal model will have to be infinitely ambiguous. A Fregean language 
constructed on the formal model will obviate the need for a finite number 
of infinitely ambiguous expressions by containing infinitely many primit­
ive expressions in its vocabulary. But in either case it will be impossible 
to state in a finite way the semantical behaviour of eacn and every expres­
sion in the vocabulary in any of its occurrences, .«.nd thus it will be 
impossible to deduce a statement of what each sentence in such a language
—Bo­
rneans ,
One mi^t think that a rule could be devised which would enable 
us to assign a semantical property to each one of the infinitely many 
expressions in the vocabulary of a Fregean language constructed on the 
formal model, it would have to be transparent for each expression to which 
semantic level it belonged: for example, each expression would have to carry 
a superscript. Hence "Socrates^" would properly occur in a context oblique to 
the fourth degree and refer to the sense of a third degree expression, 
viz, "Socrates^",
Suppose we adopt the following piece of notation,
Ref.t
is written instead of "the reference of the expression t". Then a rule of 
the kind envisaged would go something like this:
Ref, "Socrates^" = Socrates
Ref. "Socrates^" = the sense of "Socrates^"
Ref. "Socrates^" = the sense of "Socrates^ ^"
It is clear;that this is_hot a:rule which can be incorporated 
into the machinery of a truth theory. If the superscript of each expres­
sion is not a distinct syntactical component - and thus the superscript 
"4" is as much a part of "Socrates^" as "rat" is - then each such 
expression is semantically primitive. In other words, its parts have no 
separate significance. But, in that case, the three stipulations above need 
to be supplemented by infinitely many more. If, on the other hand, "Socrates" 
and its superscript are treated as syntactically distinct, then we should 
be forced to treat the superscript as making a distinct semantical contrib­
ution. But this is absurd. Moreover, the policy which Frege seems to be 
suggesting in his letter to Russell - that of introducing new primitive 
expressions into the vocabulary for each step up the semantic ladder — 
would have been renounced.
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Perhaps, though, that policy ought to be abandoned - in the manner 
of the informal model. On that model there are only finitely many primit­
ive expressions in the vocabulary. But a rule is still required to give 
tne reference of an expression in a more complex context on the basis of 
its reference in simpler ones. Writing 
Ref," t
instead of "the reference of the expression t in a context oblique to the 
n^^ degree", a first shot might go something like this;
Ref.^ "Socrates" = Socrates
Ref.^ "Socrates" = the sense of ^ "Socrates"
Ref.^ "Socrates" = the sense of ^  ^"Socrates".
But this rule does not serve its purpose. It does not give the
reference of an expression in a more complex context on the basis of its 
reference in simpler ones. Perhaps the connection ought to be made quite 
explicit. 'Then we should have:
Ref.^ "Socrates" = Socrates
Ref.^ "Socrates" = the sense referring to Ref"Socrates"
Ref.^ "Socrates" = the sense referring to Ref.^”  ^ "Socrates"
But now it is clear that the enterprise is destined to fail'^.
For the rule fails to specify uniquely what an expression refers to in a 
given context. An instance of the rule says that ^"Socrates" refers to the 
sense referring to Ref.^ "Socrates", that is, to Socrates himself. But 
more than one sense could pick out that philosopher. In attempting to state 
the reference of an expression on a certain semantic level on the basis of
its reference on the level below, the rule tries to do what cannot be done
- build a road from the reference of an expression back to its sense.
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In the abscence of a rule which stipulates the semantical behaviour 
in any of its occurrences of each expression in the vocabulary of a complex 
rregean language, a truth theory for such a language would have to contain 
infinitely many semantical axioms. But that is tantamount to saying that 
complex Fregean languages are not truth-theoretically tractable.
2. A Truth Theory for a Simple Fregean Language.
This is not to say that all languages built on the Fregean model are 
impervious to truth theory - only those languages which permit the formation 
of sentences containing oblique contexts of arbitrarily high degree. In 
fact, we need to know precisely the constraints which must be placed on 
a Fregean language in order to render it susceptible to a finite truth- 
theoretic treatment. Here it is instructive to consider the simplest 
possible Fregean language for which a finite theory of truth can be 
written. Such a language will permit the formation of sentences cont­
aining oblique contexts, but no context can be oblique to more than the first 
degree. The difficulties which attach to extending the truth theory for 
the simple Fregean language to more complex Fregean languages ( ie. those 
which permit oblique contexts of higher degree ) underline the real prob­
lem of the Fregean approach.
Below, I first construct a language, L^, containing no oblique 
contexts and write a truth theory, T^, for Lq in the metalanguage ML^
( where ML^ includes L^ =). Then a Fregean extension, L.^ , of L^ is cons- 
truoted. Finally, a truth theory, , is \vritten for in ML.| ( where 
ML^ includes L^  ).
Vocabulary
(1) A finite number of n-place predicate constants p", P^,... [eg. "loves", 
"flies", "sits"] ;
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(2) A finite number of individual constants a^, a^, ... ^eg. "Theaetetus", 
"Socrates"] ;
(3) A finite number of variables , x^, ... ;
(4) The logical constants & and =3 ;
(5) The parentheses ( , ).
[ An expression is a term iff it is an individual constant or a variable, 
We let "t^", "tg", ... be variables ranging over terms of L^, 
and "A", "B", ... be ML^ variables ranging over strings of expressions
"o']o;
Formation Rules
f  is a wff of Lg;
(2) If A and B are wffs of so are'"~A'', '”a=>3'' , '"A&B"' and '"(x^)A’’ ;
(3) Nothing else is a wff of L^.
[ a wff is closed iff it has no free variables.]
ML^ contains, in addition to and the 141^  variables mentioned 
above, "True" - a one-place predicate applying to closed wffs, and "Sat"
- a two-place relation between wffs and denumerable sequences of objects.
has the resources for sequence theory and for constructing structural 
descriptive names of expressions ( we adopt the convention of overlining 
the Lq expression in question ). We let "s", "s’", ... be variables
ranging over sequences. We write "s'^ s" for "s’ differs from s in at 
most the i^^ place". Finally, we write "s*(t)" for "the interpretation 
of the term t for the sequence s”.
Truth Theory T^ for
(1) A finite number of axioms giving the interpretation of terms:
- 44-
*
(à ) Variables; s (x_) is the i^^ member of s;
(h ) Individual Constants: a stipulation of the form s (t) for each 
constant. Thus
3 (Theaetetus) = Theaetetus
s (Socrates) = Socrates.
(2) Axioms for satisfaction;
(a ) For each primitive predicate an axiom of the form:
(s) [Sat (s, ) ) =
Q )j
where Q is replaced by the predicate P^, itself.
(B)
(s) [ Sat (s, (-^ A)) =  not (Sat (s, (a)))]
(s) [ Sat (s, (A&B)) =  (Sat (s, (A))) and (Sat (s, (b)))J
(3) Sat (s, (A=B)) =  either not (Sat (s, (A))) or (Sat (s, (b)))J
(s) [ Sat (s, (x_)A) s  (s ’ ) (s'^3 =>Sat (s', (A)))]
(5) Definition of Truth:
A wff is True in iff it is closed and satisfied by every sequence.
We proceed to construct the Fregean extension, , of L^.
Vocabulary
(1) The vocabulary of L^ ;
(2) The two-place predicate "says";
(3) The one-place functional expression "that";
(4) For each primitive expression, e (ie. every member of the vocab-
ulary except the parentheses) there is an expression in the vocabulary
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of of the form:
[eg. corresponding to "Theaetetus", "flies", and "x^", there are
the expressions " ^Theaetetus", " %lies", " " and " #x^".]
Formation Rules
(1) If A is a wff of Lq , then A is a wff of ;
(2) If A is a closed wff of L^, then says (t, that A) is a wff of ;
(3) Nothing else is a wff of .
Next is a rule which tells us how to rewrite a sentence containing an 
oblique context in a revealing manner (cf. Frege's letter quoted above)
Rewrite Rule (r )
Given an wff of the form:
says (t, that A) 
rewrite the wff in question in the form: 
says (t, a)
where OC is the string of expressions formed by writing " " immedi­
ately before each primitive expression occurring in A.
In ML^ the string of expressions, cX , is called a thought name; 
and where the wff , A, from which ot is formed, is primitive^\ di s  
called a orimitive thought name.
Truth Theory T^  for
(1) The axioms of T^ ;
(2) An axiom for the satisfaction of wffs containing oblique contexts
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(s) [Sat (s, says (t,cc)) =  says (s*(t), s*((x))j
(3) For the primitive thought names, s ( cx) is stipulated by a separate 
axiom for each name (there are only finitely many). Thus
8 ( *flies ( =^Theaetetus)) = that (flies (Theaetetus))
s ( ^hits ( *x^)) = that (sits (x^))
and so on;
(4) A finite number of axioms giving the interpretation of complex thought 
names in terms of the interpretation of primitive thou^t names.
(*-( Of.)) = s * ( » ~ )  (s * ( o l ))
((a) *& (0)) = 8 ( *&) (8 (d). 8*(P))
((cc) (|3)) = 8*( N  (s*(oi), 3*(P))
sl(^x.)(d)) = s l ^ x j  (sld))
(5) A finite number of axioms giving the interpretation of those 
expressions which operate on thoughts.
(that a ) = that'^A
s*( (that A, that S) = that A&B
s*( ^ =>) (that A, that B) = that A=>B
s ( ^x^) (that a ) = that (x^)A
(6) Definition of Truth;
A wff or is True in iff:
(1) cr is closed; and
(2) either cr is satisfied by all sequences or the formula which
results when cr is rewritten in accordance with rule (r) is
itself satisfied by all sequences.
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Le i> me forestall two objections which might be raised against 
the trutn theory , First, it may be said that there are certain expre­
ssions in the vocabulary which are not assigned a semantical property 
hy , secondly, it may be held that it is wrong to countenance "open 
thoughts"; for example, the thought that x^ sits.
It is indeed the case that there are certain expressions in 
the vocabulary which are not assigned a reference by , These are 
the expressions which figure in primitive thought names: for example,
" "^Theaetetus" and " *flies". However, certainly assigns a semant­
ical property to each of these expressions. In giving the reference of 
each and everj-- primitive thought name form able in states in a
finite way the semantical behaviour in any of its occurrences of each 
one of the expressions which go to make up the primitive thought names. 
It is quite compatible with the theory as given to assign references 
to these constituent eimpressions - for example, " "^Theaetetus" refers 
to the sense of "Theaetetus" - but it is unnecessary to do so for 
truth-theoretic purposes.
In answer to the second objection: unless the universally 
quantified content-sentences of are interpreted by T^  as complex 
( where a content-sentence is understood as complex by virtue of 
standing for a thought which is the value of a function taking one or 
more thoughts as its arguments ) would not be truth-theoretically 
tractable. For an infinite number of universally quantified content- 
sentences are formable in and if the thought names formed from
those content-sentences by application of the rewrite rule were
/
primitive, then an infinite number of semantical axioms would be 
needed stating the reference of each and every one of those thou^u 
names. Tht if universally quantified content-sentences are complex, 
then it would appear to be the case that the universal quantifier 
must be interpreted as standing in an oblique context for a function
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mapping so-called open thoughts onto thoughts. Thus T^  interprets the 
universal quantifier which occurs in "says (Theaetetus, that (x^)sits 
(^^))" standing for a function mapping the (open) thou^t that x^ 
sits onto the thought that (x^)sits(x^).
But what exactly is an open thought? The answer is simply that 
an open thought is the sense of a sentence containing a free variable. 
The problem lies in fitting the notion of an open thought into the 
framework of Fregean theory. For Frege does not allow as well-formed 
sentences containing free variables. Thus Frege would regard the 
universally quantified sentence:
(x^)sits(x^)
as formed not by joining the universal quantifier "(x^)" to the open 
sentence "sits(x^)"; but by attaching the quantifier, construed as a 
second-level predicate "(x^)$(x^)", to the first-level predicate 
"sits(^)". Hence, the variable bound by a quantifier is understood as 
having been introduced with the quantifier itself. Now, the Fregean view 
of quantification in combination with the doctrine ascribed to Frege 
earlier in this chapter; that the indirect reference of a predicate 
is that function which constitutes its ordinary sense, would appear to 
dictate that the universal quantifier which occurs in "says (Theaetetus, 
that (x^)sits(x^))" stands for a (second-level) function mapping that 
function which constitutes the ordinary sense of "sits(^)" onto the
thought that (x^)sits(x^).
Thus T^  does not describe the universally quantified content- 
Qp Xj^ in terms of the semantic structure wi th v/hich these 
sentences are endowed by Fregean theory. Nevertheless, an easy method 
of resolving the difficulty suggests itself. We can identify the sense
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of a sentence containing a free variable with the sense of the pred­
icate j.ormed from that sentence by omission of the variable. In other 
words, an open thought is to be regarded as nothing more than the 
sense of a predicate, ie, a function mapping the senses of proper 
names onto thoughts. In response to the objection that thou^ts are 
objects, we need only point out that open thoughts are, strictly
speaking, not thoughts at all; we treat them as if they were thoughts
”12in order to render accessible to a finite theory of truth.
5. A Hierarchy of Fregean Languages
A Fregean language of scant expressive power has proved to be
susceptible to a finite truth-theoretic treatment. This is not to say
that Fregean languages of greater complexity than L^  are necessarily
inaccessible to truth theory. Indeed, a finite theory of truth can be
'written for a Fregean extension, L^, of L^.
Lp, a langua.ge which permits oblique contexts of the second
degree and no higher, is constructed from L^  in mucn the same way as
L was constructed from L^. A new rewrite rule will be needed telling 
1 0
us how to rewrite sentences containing doubly oblique contexts in a 
revealing manner. New primitive expressions will be introduced into 
the vocabular;}'' to stand in doubly oblique contexts for the senses of 
primitive L^  expressions. Thus "#^*Theaetetus" will refer to the 
sense of " ^Theaetetus", And, of course, there will have to be a rule 
which allows for the formation of sentences containing contexts oblique 
to the second degree and no higner.
Construction at' a trith theory, T^ , for Lp will parallel 
the cor.-5truetion of for L,. In other words, new semantic machinery
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will be grafted onto an existing tnth theory. An axiom giving the 
satisfaction conditions of sentences containing doubly oblique 
contexts will form an integral part of this additional machinery. There 
will also be a finite number of axioms stipulating the semantical 
behaviour of (indirect) thought names - formed by application of the 
rewrite rule for upon content-sentences in double oratio obliqua.
V,'e need not stop at L^. can itself be extended into a 
Fregean language, L^, which permits the formation of sentences contain­
ing trebly oblique contexts. And can be similarly extended - into 
L^, And so on. The result is a whole hierarchy of increasingly complex 
Fregean languages, each language in the hierarchy being the extension 
of ( and thus permitting the formation of oblique contexts of one 
degree higher than those permitted by ) the language on the level 
below. Moreover, the finite truth theory for each one of these languages 
will consist of the finite truth theory for the language on the level 
below plus a significant amount of truth-theoretic machinery - at 
least as much machinery, in fact, as was needed in order to extend Tq 
into T^.
A tnith-predicate can be recursively characterized for each 
one of the languages , L^ , ... precisely because each such language 
places a restriction upon the length of the string of indirect speech 
verbs which may be permitted to appear in an oratio obliqua sentence 
of that language. In each case, the formation rules effectively 
prohibit oblique contexts of higher than a certain degree. 'The truth 
theory for a Fregean language which matched the expressive power of 
natural language and, hence, permitted the lormation of sentences 
containing oblique contexts of arbitrarily hi.gh degree would nave to 
contain an infinite amount of semantic machinery.1- Thus, only those
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Fregsan languages of limited expressive power relative to natural 
language are truth-theoretically tractable. This suggests very strongly 
that the Fregean approach to indirect discourse in natural language 
is fundamentally inadequate.
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CHAPTER THREE
MON-INTENSIONAL THEORIES OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE
- 53-
Since Frege, philosophers have become hardened to the idea 
that content-sentences in talk about prepositional attitudes 
may strangely refer to such entities as intensions, propositions, 
sentences, utterances and inscriptions. What is strange is not 
the entities, which are all ri^t in their place ( if they 
have one ), but the notion that ordinary words for planets, 
people, tables and hippopotami in indirect discourse may give 
up these pedestrian references for the exotica. If we could 
recover our pre-Frege an semantic innocence, I think it would 
seem to us plainly incredible that the words "Hie earth moves", 
uttered after the words "Galileo said that", mean anything 
different, or refer to anything else, than is their wont when 
they come in other environments.
mVIDSON
NON-INTENSIONAL 'THEORIES OF INDIRECT DISCOURSE 
1. Quine's Theory.
Oratio obliqua sentences are problematic precisely because the 
ascription of familiar structure to the string of words following 
"said that" results in the failure of the very logical consequences 
which may be expected to flow under such circumstances. It is a familiar 
point that the conjunction of:
(1) Dick said that George Eliot was a genius
and
(2) George Eliot = Mary Ann Evans,
fails to imply:
(3) Dick said that Mary Ann Evans was a genius.
Now Quine has shown that sentences like (l) and (3) 2,re open 
to at least two different readings.^ I’he notional readings of (l) and
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(3) are represented thus:
(in) Dick said [George Eliot was a genius ]
(3N) Dick said [Mary Ann Evans was a genius ]
Each of the sentences (1N) and (3N) asserts that a relation holds 
between Dick and an intension of degree 0, or a proposition. The 
squai*e brackets mark off the portion of the sentence which is to be 
taken as naming the intension in question. Quine is not adopting a 
Fregean position; for he regards intensions as "creatures of darkness" 
to be eliminated in the final reckoning; and, moreover, he prohibits 
quantifying into ( what we are to regard provisionally as ) the names 
of intensions. We are to see the name of an intension not as made up of 
a string of expressions, each one of which stands for an intension in 
its own right; but as a referentially inarticulate whole, ie. as a 
single long expression whose parts have no separate significance. Since 
there is no question of making substitutions of any kind within such an 
expression, we have an adequate account of the failure of (l) and (2) 
to imply (5).
Sentences (1) and (3) need not, however, be interpreted as 
asserting that a dyadic relation holds between a speaker and a prop­
osition. They can be given relational readings, thus:
(1R) Dick said y [y was a genius] of George Eliot
(3R) Dick said y [y was a genius] of Mary Ann Evans
both (1R) and (3R) assert that an irreducibly triadic relation holds
among a speaker, an object and an intension of degree 1, or an attribute.
In each case, the name of the person of whom Dick has said something
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appears outside of the referentially inarticulate portion of the sentence 
( viz, the name of the attribute ) and hence in a normal referential 
position. Thus the conjunction of (1R) and (2) is taken to imply (3#). 
Relational readings of this kind are not unkno^Æ in ordinary language. 
And, clearly, the ordinary language paraphrase of (1R):
Dick said of George Eliot that she was a genius
implies ( in conjunction with (2) ) the ordinary language paraphrase 
of (3H):
Dick said of Mary Ann Evans that she was a genius
Moreover, we are now in the position to represent "There is someone 
whom Dick said to be a genius" without saddling ourselves with a 
variable inside of the scope of the indirect speech verb bound by a 
quantifier outside of that scope. We merely have to quantify into the 
triadic indirect speech construction, thus:
(^x)( Dick said y [y was a genius] of x )
Quine is undoubtedly correct in his claim that oratio obliqua 
sentences are open to at least two different readings. However, the 
theory of indirect discourse which emerges hand in hand with this wholly 
acceptable doctrine is itself rather less than satisfactory. A 
suspicious aroma is given off by Quine's contention that the exportation 
of a singular term from within the name of an intension to a normal 
referential position ought to be viewed in general as implicative.^
The point which prompts this contention is not itself at issue: that 
the notional reading of an oratio obliqua sentence implies the relational 
reading. Rather, the trouble concerns the thesis that the name of an
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intension is referentially inarticulate, or opaque. If the name of an 
intension is, as Quine appears to be suggesting, a single long expression 
whose parts have no separate significance, then the exportation of one 
of those parts from within the name of the intension to an external 
position would be meaningless. To put the point bluntly: there would be 
no singular term there in the first place to export.
It would be unfair to criticize Quine's theory of indirect dis­
course on another count; that it makes explicit reference to intensional 
entities. For Quine does fulfil his.promise to exorcise intensions from 
his ontology. He writes:
... a final alternative that I find as appealing as any is 
simply to dispense with the objects of the prepositional attitudes. 
We can continue to formulate the prepositional attitudes 
with help of the notations of intensional abstraction ... 
but just cease to view these notations as singular terms 
referring to objects.^
Thus, (1N) is no longer to be seen as assering that a dyadic relation
holds between Dick and a proposition. Rather, it must be viewed as of
the form:
Fa
with "Dick" as the individual constant, a, and "said [George Eliot 
was a genius]" as F, a one-place predicate. Where we have the triadic 
indirect speech construction, the indirect speech verb accordingly 
becomes part of a two-place predicate true of ordered pairs of 
speakers and objects, (1R) is therefore to be viewed as of the form:
Fab
with "said y [y was a genius] of" as F, a two-place predicate true 
of the ordered pair consisting of Dick and George Eliot. In each case, 
the indirect speech verb is absorbed into what Quine regards as the 
referentially opaque portion of the sentence.
Quine's rather radical strategy - that of welding the indirect
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speech verb onto the content-sentence following and treating the 
whole as a semantically primitive predicate - has certain attractions.
The apparent failure of extensionality associated with oratio obliqua 
sentences can be blamed upon our mistakenly supposing that the 
semantically inert expressions which occur in the content-sentences 
can be regarded as having a separate significance. According to the 
Quinean view, once it is realised that the expression "George Eliot" 
figuring in (1) is not really a name, but in actual fact an insignif­
icant component of the semantically primitive predicate "said-that- 
George-Eliot-was-a-genius", then the temptation to replace that 
component with the genuine name "Mary Ann Evans”, or to quantify into 
the content-sentence of (l), will disappear. And since the content- 
sentence itself is not to be viewed as a distinct syntactical 
component of the containing oratio obliqua sentence, there is no need 
to supply an intension as its semantical role.
One thing that transpired from the critique of the Fregean 
approach to indirect discourse undertaken in the first two chapters of 
this essay was that an adequate theory of indirect discourse must meet 
at least two requirements. First, it must abjure reference to intens­
ional entities ( thoughts, meanings, propositions etc, ). And, secondly, 
it must permit the recursive characterization of a truth-predicate in 
Tarski's fashion for language containing the oratio obliqua construction, 
'The great failing of Quine's theory of indirect discourse is that it 
does not meet the second of these two requirements.
As we have seen, the content-sentence of an oratio obliqua 
sentence is understood by Quine to be an insignificant component 
of the complex predicate formed by attaching that content-sentence to 
the words "said that", Quine's theory requires that we regard
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predicates of the kind envisaged - eg, "said-that-Mary-Ann-Evans- 
was-a-genius" - as semantically primitive. In other words, they cannot 
he understood as owing their semantical properties to the contribution 
of the expressions of which they are structurally composed. Rather, 
each such predicate is to be seen as a primitive constituent of the 
vocabulary for the language of which it is a part. And thus the truth 
theory for such a language would have to contain a semantical axiom 
for each such predicate stipulating its semantical behaviour in any of 
its occurrences. ‘The problem for Quine is that there are infinitely 
many such predicates formable in a natural language.^ Hence, the 
truth theory for a natural language construed along Quinean lines 
would fail to meet Tarski's criterion of adequacy - infinitely many 
semantical axioms would be needed.
by treating oratio obliqua sentences as syntactically composed 
of the name of a speaker attached to a primitive one-place predicate 
( or, in the case of the relational construction, as composed of the 
name of a speaker and the name of an object attached to a primitive 
two-place predicate ), Quine manages to sidestep the problems 
customarily associated with indirect discourse, but the avoidance of 
awkward problems by the dissolution of the semantic structure of the 
indirect speech verb and the content-sentence within its scope is 
paid for in the long run. The resulting theory 'of indirect discourse 
fails to do the very first thing we would want such a thing to do: 
it fails to describe oratio obliqua sentences in a semantically 
revealing way. There is no question of showing in a finite and system­
atic fashion how the truth-value of each oratio obliqua sentence 
formable in a natural language depends upon the contribution of its 
Darts.
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There is a further difficulty, Quine's theory of indirect 
discourse is incompatible with his contention that the problem of 
determining the extent to which the content-sentence can deviate from 
direct quotation is a problem in translation,^  If the oratio obliqua 
sentence:
(4) Galileo said that the earth moves
is to be treated as composed of two semantically primitive expressions, 
the name "Galileo" and the one-place predicate "said-that-the-earth-moves", 
then there is simply no significant component of (4) which can plausibly 
be said to translate Galileo's actual utterance, viz, "Eppur si muove".
In rejecting Quins's theory of indirect discourse over its
failure to accommodate the thesis that the content-sentence of a true
oratio obliqua sentence must (in some sense) be a translation of the
utterance being reported, it must not be thought that we are thereby
accepting the translation point itself. It was suggested at an earlier
7
stage in this essay that the relationship between the content-sentence 
and the utterance being reported cannot usefully be viewed as specif­
ically akin to the relationship which holds between sentences said to 
translate one another. The point is that Quine's theory of indirect 
discourse not only fails to make room for the translation point; it 
is also incompatible with any theory designed to explain the mechanism 
of indirect quotation on the basis of a relationship between the content- 
sentence and the original utterance. For, according to Quine, the 
content-sentence is not a genuine syntactical component of the cont­
aining oratio obliqua sentence. In other words,it is not, logically 
speaking, a sentence at all. In the abscence of any other distinct 
syntactical component of an oratio obliqua sentence with which to
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relate the original speaker's words, Quine's theory renders impossible 
the forging of a semantically revealing connection between those 
original words and the oratio obliqua sentence used to report them,
A theory of indirect discourse must explain the mechanism of 
indirect quotation or be compatible with such an explanation. It is 
plausible to hold that a theory can only meet this requirement by 
interpreting the content-sentence as a sentence and not as an insignif­
icant portion of a single, semanticauLly primitive expression. So let us 
leave Quine's manifestly unsatisfactory theory on one side ( remember­
ing, at the same time, that we fully accept the distinction between 
the notional and the relational readings of an oratio obliqua sentence, 
the distinction to which Quine drew our attention ), We move on to
consider a theory which appears to meet all of our requirements. This
0
is Geach's quotational theory of indirect discourse.
2, Geach's Theory.
Geach argues that oratio obliqua is logically superfluous and 
can everywhere be replaced with oratio recta.■In other words, each 
sentence containing indirect speech must be viewed as logically equival­
ent to a sentence containing direct speech.
At first sight, this suggestion presents an implausible appearance 
The oratio recta sentence:
(5) Galileo said "The earth moves"
implies that Galileo uttered an English sentence; wheras no such 
implication is carried by the related oratio obliqua sentence, (4),
Geach points out, however, that there is a metaphorical use of oratio 
recta whereby thoughts are reported. He cites this Biblical example:
— 6l —
'The fool hath said in his heart "There is no God"
This sentence need not be understood as asserting that the thinker 
had the quoted words in his mind. What we need is a version of (5) 
which contains the quoted sentence but which does not imply that 
Galileo uttered that sentence, Geach suggests that this sentence will 
do;
5 (6) Galileo said something tantamount to "The earth moves",
(6) asserts that Galileo stands in a certain relationship towards 
the sentence "The earth moves" - that relationship which holds between 
a speaker and a sentence just in case the former utters a sentence 
tantamount to the latter. Since Galileo’s actual utterance, viz,
"Eppur si muove", tantamount to the quoted sentence "The earth 
moves", (6) constitutes a correct report of what Galileo said,
‘The following objection is usually directed against quotational 
theories of indirect discourse, ‘The content-sentence of an oratio 
obliqua sentence must be understood as belonging to the very same 
language as the containing oratio obliqua sentence itself. The result 
of putting a foreign sentence into the slot in "Galileo said that
_______" would be patently ill-formed. Thus we have no choice but to
regard the sentence "The earth moves" in (4) as part of the home 
language. Not so for the sentence quoted in (6). For it is clearly 
the case that we can put a foreign sentence into the slot in "Galileo 
said something tantamount to ’ ’ " and end up with a perfectly
well-formed English sentence. It is therefore well within the bounds 
of possibility that the sentence quoted in (6) be a sentence of some 
language other than English, But if the sentence quoted in (6) need 
not mean that the earth moves, then (4) and (6) cannot be viewed as
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logically equivalent.
Q
The objection derives from Church and is readily taken up 
by Davidson;
We can scoff at the notion that if we analyze "Galileo said 
that the earth moves" as asserting a relation between Galileo 
and the sentence "The earth moves" we must assume Galileo 
spoke English, but we cannot afford to scoff at the assumption 
that on this analysis the words of the content-sentence are to 
be understood as an English sentence.
For one who took this objection seriously, the obvious move 
would be to specify in the oratio recta version itself that the quoted 
sentence was an English sentence, but a version of (6) which made an 
explicit reference to English, thus;
(7) Galileo said something tantamount to the English sentence 
“The earth moves"
could not be counted as logically equivalent to (4), If (4) and (7) 
were logically equivalent, then the "said that" of an English oratio 
obliqua sentence would have to be viewed as making an implicit reference 
to English. But in that case the English words "said that" and the 
Italian words "diceva che" could no longer be said to translate one 
another.
There is, however, no need to adopt (7) in preference to (6) 
as the oratio recta version of (4). For the Church objection which 
prompts the replacement of (6) by the unacceptable (7) is founded upon 
a simple mistake. It is undeniably the case that the sentence quoted 
in the oratio recta sentence (6) may be equiform with a sentence of 
some foreign language ( some unknown jungle language, say ) and that 
this foreign sentence may not mean that the earth moves. Vhat is 
overlooked by those who find the Church objection plausible is that 
the sentence "The earth moves" which is quoted in (6) and a non-
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synonymous equiform sentence in an exotic foreign language would be 
different sentences ( and not the same sentence in different languages )• 
Consequently, the oratio recta sentence formed by inserting the English 
sentence "The earth moves" into the slot in "Galileo said something
tantamount to *_______*" would be different from the oratio recta
sentence formed by inserting the imagined foreign sentence "The earth 
moves" into the very same slot. 'The latter oratio recta sentence would 
not be logically equivalent to (4).
A practical difficulty suggests itself. How do we know whether 
the sentence quoted in (6) is the English sentence "The earth moves" 
or its equiform foreign counterpart? And thus how do we know whether
(6) is logically equivalent to (4) or not? As Geach points out, help 
is not necessarily provided by saving-clauses and provisos inserted 
next to the quoted sentence; for the foreign language may contain 
expressions equiform to them also. Even if we succeeded in unambig­
uously picking out the ri^t language ( the language spoken in 1976 
by the majority of the inhabitants of those islands on the western 
seaboard of Europe ) the "said that" of oratio obliqua, as we 
noticed in our dealings with sentence (7), would have to bear the 
weight of the individuating information. But none of this is in any 
way necessary. 'The (linguistic or non-linguistic) context within 
which (6) is uttered will .make it abundantly clear in practice 
whether the utterer in question intends the quoted sentence to be 
understood as the Eiiglish sentence "The earth moves" or as a distinct, 
but equiform, sentence belonging to a foreign language. Of course, the 
overwhelming likelihood is that an utterer of an English oratio recta 
sentence like (6) will intend the quoted sentence to be understood as 
a familiar English sentence.
There is a second objection made against quotational theories 
of indirect discourse. This objection, once again originating from
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Church and echoed by Davidson , concerns the behaviour under trans­
lation of an oratio obliqua sentence and its oratio recta Ersatz. The 
argument goes like this: sentences (4) and (6) cannot be logically 
equivalent because their respective translations into a foreign language 
are patently non-equivalent. Suppose we translate (4) and (6) into 
Italian, ‘Then ( according to the Church view ) they go over respectively 
into:
(41) Galileo diceva che la terra si muove
(61) Galileo diceva quanto segue "The earth moves"
The quotation "'The earth moves'” in (6) appears in (61) as "'The 
earth moves'" and not as "'la terra si muove'" precisely because (6) 
asserts that a relationship holds between Galileo and the sentence 
"The earth moves"; and one would expect (61) to assert the very same 
thing. Of course, the content-sentence of (4), viz, "The earth moves", 
is mapped onto the Italian sentence "La terra si muove", the latter 
appearing as the content-sentence of (4I)»
Here is the crux of the Church argument; (4) and (6) cannot be 
logically equivalent because an Italian, ignorant of English, would be 
unable to infer (61) from (41) •
'The following assumption lurks in the shadows; that the logical 
equivalence of two sentences belonging to the same language is reflected 
in the ability of a native speaker to infer the one from the other.
Let us interpret this assumption as charitably as possible and not 
make the obvious rejoinder that a native speaker may not even be able 
to understand the sentence in question ( ie, they may relate to an 
excessively abstruse subject matter ), It must be possible in principle 
at least for a native speaker to make the required inference. And
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( according to Church ) this is just what an Italian, ignorant of 
English, cannot do with (4I) and (6I), The reason is obvious: the 
Italian would be unable to know what (61) meant on account of the fact 
that it contains the English quotation "’The earth moves'".
Church's argument is odd. We are being asked to accept two 
seemingly incompatible things; that sentence (6) has been translated 
into Italian and that an inability to speak English prevents an Italian 
from understanding the putative translation. A translation can hardly 
be counted as successful unless a native speaker of the language into 
which translation has proceeded has been put in the position ( in 
principle at least ) to understand the translated sentence. The 
obvious conclusion to draw from the fact that an Italian, ignorant of 
English, would be unable to understand (61) is that (61) is not an 
adequate Italian translation of (6). The Italian sentence:
(61*) Galileo diceva quanto segue "La terra si muove"
would be far more suitable. Here we have permitted the English quotation
"'The earth moves'" in (6) to go over into the Italian quotation
"'La terra si muove*".
But if a quotation names the expression quoted ( ie. the
expression which stands between the quotes ), then the move from (6)
to (6I') fails to preserve reference. For the quotation "’The earth 
moves'" in (6) must be taken as naming the English sentence "The earth 
moves”; and the quotation "'La terra si muove'" in (6I') must be taken 
as naming the Italian sentence "La terra si muove". It would be quite 
wrong, however, to conclude from this that acceptance of (6I*) as the 
Italian translation of (6) involves turning a blind eye to the canons of 
precise translation. As Geach points out, a translator of a book who
Ly
- 66-
left all the directly quoted dialogue in the original language would 
be regarded as perversely wrong, not pedantically correct.Rather, 
the fact that the move from (6) to (6l') fails to preserve reference 
should be counted as showing that reference is not invariant under 
translation between languages.^^
That there are circumstances under which translation need not 
preserve reference suggests in its turn that meaning need not be 
preserved either. Following this line of thou^t, the move from (6) 
to (6l ‘) would have to be viewed as failing to preserve meaning.
And this failure to preserve meaning would have to be blamed upon the 
quotations which appear respectively in (6) and (6l'). From one point 
of view, this looks perfectly reasonable; if the quotations "'The earth 
moves'" and "'La terra si muove*" are names with different references, 
then one would hardly expect them to be synonymous. And yet this concl­
usion grates on our intuitions. If the sentences;
The earth moves
La terra si muove
are synonymous, then it would seem hard to deny that the quotations 
formed by enclosing those sentences respectively in quotes, thus;
"The earth moves"
"La terra si muove"
would themselves be synonymous.
There is no need, however, to make the case against Church 
rest upon acceptance of the thesis that the quotations "’The earth 
moves'" and "'La terra si muove'" mean the same thing. For the sake of 
argument, let us concede that these quotations are not synonymous and 
hence that (6) and (6l*) have different meanings. ( This concession
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need not involve us in giving up the view that (.61*) is an adequate 
translation of (6), ) It follows that the predicates:
X is tantamount to “The earth moves"
and
X is tantamount to "La terra si muove"
will themslves have different meanings. But the important point is 
that these predicates will be coextensive. For a sentence will be 
tantamount to the English sentence "The earth moves" just in case it 
is tantamount to the Italian sentence "La terra si muove".
The predicates in question are coextensive because the directly 
quoted sentences they contain - "The earth moves" and "La terra si muove" 
- mean the same thing. Indeed, given any two sentences which have the 
same meaning, it is plausible to hold that a sentence will be tanta­
mount to the first just in case it is tantamount to the second. This 
is not to say that the relationship which holds between any two sentences 
where the first can be said to be tantamount to the second is necess- 
^ arily that of synonymy. Galileo's original utterance, viz. "Eppur si 
muove", is tantamount to each of the directly quoted sentences '"The 
earth moves" and "La teira si muove". It is in virtue of this fact 
that the oratio recta sentences (6) and (6l') ( and (6l) for that 
matter ) report correctly what Galileo said. But neither of the directly 
quoted sentences preserves the meaning of Galileo's original utterance.
It is important to point out that one can both concede that 
the quotations "'The earth moves’" and "'La terra si muove'" have 
different meanings and at the same time hold that the predicates 
"x is tantamount to 'The earth moves'" and "x is tantamount to 'La
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terra si muove»" are coextensive. For this reason. If Church ^  ri^t
and, hence, the quotations in question genuinely have different meanings,
then the respective oratio recta versions of (4) and (41), viz, (6)
and (61»), would themselves have to be viewed as having different
meanings. In view of the fact that the oratio obliqua sentences (4) and
(41) are ( to all intents and purposes ) synonymous, the conclusion
would appear to be warranted that each oratio obliqua sentence differs
in meaning from its «oratio recta Ersatz. This conclusion need not,
however, be seen as particularly damaging to Geach's theory of indirect
discourse. For Geach's theory will still be in business if there is
nothing more than a systematic agreement in truth-value between each
oratio obliqua sentence and its oratio recta Ersatz. That there is
such a systematic agreement in truth-value is suggested by the fact
that the predicates in question are coextensive,
Quine ends his article "Quantifiers and Prepositional Attitudes"
on a rather pessimistic note concerning quotational theories;
'The prepositional attitudes are dim affairs to begin with, and 
it is a pity to have to add obscurity to obscurity by bringing 
in language variables too. Only let it not be supposed that any 
clarity is gained by restituting the intensions,
L/
Geach's theory makes such pessimism appear unwarranted; no recourse is 
made to intensions and the sentence quoted in the oratio recta version 
need not be relativized explictly to a particular language. However, 
the quotation is itself a fresh source of problems. Quotations must 
be regarded as semantically complex expressions, ie. as built up in a 
finite number of steps from a finite number of semantically primitive 
elements; otherwise the language of vhich the quotations form a part 
would not be accessible to a truth theory meeting Tarski's criterion of 
adequacy, bhat this goes to show is that a quotational theory of 
indirect discourse like that of Geach needs to be backed up by an
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acceptable account of quotation, an account which reads a recursive 
structure into quotations,
Davidson himself furnishes such an account, A quotation is to 
be viewed as giving an abbreviated structural description of the 
sentence quoted, 'The full structural description is provided by a complex 
singular term into which the quotation may be expanded. This complex 
singular teirn describes the quoted sentence in terms of the letters 
and punctuation signs it contains and their order. Thus the 
quotation;
"The earth moves" 
may be expanded into;
MijitJ/— ' »»gn tt r\ i»qM /— s
Hyi; r-\ IlgM
The names of letters and of punctuation signs, and the sign for 
concatenation, will have to be introduced into the vocabulary for the 
language to which the quotation belongs, No problems arise here; for 
^ there are but finitely many such names. And the only entities which 
have to be added to our ontology are perfectly respectable, viz, 
punctuation signs and letters.
We have what appears to be an adequate account of quotation in 
hand. So why not accept Geach's quotational theory of indirect discourse? 
The ontology to which the theory commits us contains no disreputable 
elements. No particular difficulty seems to attach to the recursive 
characterization of a truth-predicate for languages containing the 
oratio obliqua construction. And room is left for a theoretical account 
of the relationship which holds between two sentences just in case the
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one can be said to be tantamount to the other. Nonetheless, Davidson 
claims that there is yet another requirement on a theory of indirect 
discourse, a requirement which quotational theories cannot but fail to 
meet. A theory of indirect discourse must account for the fact that 
the content-sentence of an oratio obliqua sentence is used to say 
something.
Davidson introduces the notion of samesaying in order to bring 
out the full force of this additional requirement. Galileo and I are 
samesayers just in case an utterance of mine matches one of his in 
import. Consequently, when I utter the oratio recta sentence (6), 
viz.
Galileo said something tantamount to "'The earth moves"
I say that Galileo and I are samesayers. For I mention a sentence of 
mine ( belonging to my language ) and assert that Galileo's original 
sentence matches mine in import. But ( according to Davidson ) I 
cannot be said thereby to have made Galileo and me samesayers. For 
I have failed to use ray sentence "The earth moves" ( it has been 
^merely mentioned ). And it is a necessary condition of my having 
made Galileo and me samesayers - and, hence, of my having said 
\diat Galileo said - that I use a sentence which matches Galileo's 
original sentence in import. Now, when I utter the oratio obliqua 
sentence (4)j viz.
Galileo said that the earth moves
it is undeniable that I succeed in saying what Galileo said. But if 
my utterance of (4) makes Galileo and me samesayers, then it is hard to 
see how (4) can be equivalent to (6) ray utterance of which fails to
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do so.
Such is Davidson's objection to quotational theories of indirect 
discourse. He regards such theories as totally unable to accommodate 
the fact that the content-sentence of an oratio obliqua sentence like 
(4) is used.to say what the original speaker said. 'Thus he writes:
... the theory brings the content-sentence into the act sealed
in quotation marks, and on any standard theory of quotation
this means the content-sentence is mentioned and not used.
The account of quotation given above reinforces the point. 
Expansion of the quotation in (6) into a complex singular term of the 
kind considered ( ie. one which describes the sentence quoted in 
terms of the letters and punctuation signs it contains and their 
order ) makes it difficult to view the quoted sentence as being used 
to say something.
'That Geach's theory of indirect discourse is proof against 
Davidson's objection will become clear as the discussion proceeds.
First, however, let us consider the extremely powerful theory of 
indirect discourse erected by Davidson upon ( what he considers to be ) 
the ruins of the quotational theories. Our subsequent rebuttal of the 
^Davidson "samesaying” objection will then gain in interest; for 
there are very strong similarities between Geach's theory of indirect 
discourse and the theory adopted by Davidson in preference to a quotat­
ional theory. Notwithstanding the fact that there is a marked kinship 
between their theories, however, the last stage of this essay will 
consist of an attempt to drive a wedge between the positions adopted 
respectively by Geach and Davidson,
5. Davidson’s Theory.
The essence of Davidson's so-called paratactic theory of indirect 
discourse is that an oratio obliqua sentence is to be viewed as
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syntactically composed of two distinct sentences, between which there 
holds no logical or semantic connection. One of these sentences is the 
content-sentence. The other is the sentence to which we ascribe a 
truth-value, and this consists of just that part of the oratio obliqua 
sentence ivhich occurs outside of the content-sentence, for example:
Galileo said that.
Here we have a singular term referring to a speaker, the two-place 
predicate "said", and the demonstrative "that". The demonstrative 
refers to an utterance of the content-sentence following. Thus when 
I utter (4) above, the "that" refers to my utterance of the content- 
sentence:
The earth moves.
Juxtaposition of the sentence to which we ascribe a truth-value and 
the content-sentence produces a semantically revealing version of the 
whole oratio obliqua sentence, thus:
^ (8) Galileo said that.
'The earth moves.
Davidson's claim is that his theory meets all the requirements 
on a theory of indirect discourse. First; no recourse is made to 
intensional entities. 'The singular term "The earth" in (8) stands for 
its customary reference, viz, the earth. At the same time, the apparent 
failure of extensionality associated with oratio obliqua is explained. 
For we make substitutions in the content-sentence but it is the other 
sentence which changes in truth-value. And ( speaking in terms of 
utterances as Davidson advises ) any change at all in the utterance of
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the content-sentence, even where the replacing expression has the same 
reference as the one being replaced, mi^t involve a change in truth- 
value for the introducing utterance, or performative. Secondly; the 
uttered content-sentence appearing after the performative has a perfectly 
familiar structure. It is therefore accessible to the standard truth- 
theoretic treatment. Thirdly: Davidson's theory is compatible with an 
account of the mechanism of indirect quotation. Indeed, he furnishes 
one. Thus, the utterance introduced by the performative must give the 
content of the sentence uttered by the speaker being reported. Finally; 
the theory accounts for the fact that my utterance of a true oratio 
obliqua sentence makes me and the speaker being reported samesayers.
For the theory counts me as uttering the content-sentence; and this 
particular utterance matches the utterance of the original speaker in 
import.
We need not dwell upon the virtues of Davidson's theory. It is 
a poweful and compelling theory. And it is not the least of its 
attractions that it counts oratio obliqua senteces as wearing their 
logical form on their sleeves ( to use Davidson's own metaphor ).
Geach clearly cannot say as much for his theory. What we must do at 
present, however, is rebut the "samesaying" objection, levelled by 
Davidson against quotational theories of indirect discourse. For it 
was the supposed failure of the quotational theories to account for the 
fact that my utterance of the oratio obliqua sentence (4) makes Galileo 
and me samesayers which prompted Davidson to urge the claims of his 
paratactic theory upon us. Once it is understood that Geach's theory no 
less than Davidson's accounts for the same saying relation which holds 
between the utterer of a true oratio obliqua sentence and the person 
he reports, then we will be in a position to expatiate upon the relative
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merits of the two theories.
Davidson's "samesaying" objection relies upon a rather dubious 
premise; that a sentence which is being mentioned ( ie. quoted ) is 
ipso facto not being used. This premise does not bear a close scrutiny. 
According to the standard account of quotation, we use a quotation 
like "'The earth moves'" to mention ( talk about ) the quoted sentence: 
in this case "The earth moves". But it is misleading to speak as if 
mention of a sentence precluded its use. Rather, what we should say 
is that the sentence "The earth moves" mentioned in the oratio recta 
sentence (6), viz,
Galileo said something tantamount to "The earth moves"
is being used, but in a special way. And thus the utterer of (6) 
cannot be accused of failing to use a sentence which matches Galileo's 
"Eppur si muove" in import.
In other words; when one utters the quotation "'The earth 
moves'", one has thereby uttered the quoted sentence "The earth moves". 
Seen in one li^t this is even a truism: for ( as Geach indicates ) 
nothing in spoken language corresponds to the use of quotation marks.
And thus an utterance of ""^ The earth moves'" and an utterance of "The 
earth moves" are phonetically quite alike. But if giving utterance to 
a quotation involves ( at least sometimes ) giving utterance to the 
sentence quoted, then it is not implausible to hold that one who utters 
the whole of the oratio recta sentence (6) ( including the quotation 
"'The earth moves'" ) has thereby uttered the sentence "'The earth moves"; 
and this is enough to make him stand in the samesaying relation towards 
Galileo. This is not to ignore the role of the quotation marks. 'These 
signal that the utterer of the quoted sentence has used it nonassertively.
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We have still to deal with the point that expansion of the 
quotation in (6) in the manner suggested by Davidson’s account of 
quotation makes it supremely hard to view the utterer of (6) as having 
said what Galileo said. Ihe only answer is to provide an alternative 
account of quotation: one which reads a recursive structure into 
quotations and, furthermore, which enables us to retain the insist 
that Galileo and the utterer of (6) are samesayers. Geach himself 
provides such an account. We are to read a quotation not in Davidson’s 
fashion, ie, as a series of quoted letters and punctuation signs; but 
rather as a series of quoted words, Geach sums the account up perfectly 
with the following slogan:
A quoted series of expressions is always a series of quoted
expressions.
In other words; a quotation is to be viewed as a complex singular 
term giving a description of the sentence quoted in terras of the words 
it contains and their order, The intimation that Galileo and I are 
samesayers is not lost in the version of (6) where the quotation has 
been expanded in accordance with Geach*s account, thus:
^ Galileo said something tantamount to ’’The”^"earth"^"moves”
It has become increasingly clear that Geach anticipated 
Davidson's theory of indirect discourse in certain respects. Both 
theories count an oratio obliqua sentence as having correctly reported 
the original speaker just in case ( an utterance of ) the content- 
sentence is tantamount to, gives the content of, the sentence uttered 
by the original speaker. The purpose served on Davidson's theoiy by 
counting the content-sentence as semantically independent of the 
relevant attribution of a saying is served on Geach's theory by 
viewing the content-sentence as operating within concealed quotation
- 76-
marks. In each case, an explanation is furnished for the fact that 
substitutions within the content-sentence need not have any particular 
effect upon the truth-value of the whole oratio obliqua sentence ( upon 
the truth-value of the performative in Davidson’s case ).
And yet there are obvious differences. There is no need to take 
too much notice of Geach‘s failure to introduce a demonstrative element 
into his oratio recta paraphrase. For he comes very near to doing so in 
certain parts of his exposition. Of far more importance is the fact that 
Geach takes the component exprssions of the content-sentence as stand­
ing for themselves. Davidson, on the other hand, cleaves to the rather 
winning thesis that singular terms in indirect speech have their 
customary references. But in order to reconcile this thesis with the 
apparent failure of extensionality associated with oratio obliqua, he 
is forced into construing the content-sentence as semantically insul­
ated from what goes before. Geach is under no such compulsion; and thus 
he can treat the expressions in the content-sentence as making a 
semantical contribution towards the truth-value of the whole oratio 
obliqua sentence.
c Davidson’s theory is prima facie the more attractive of the two. 
For a theory which invites us to see oratio obliqua sentences as 
overtly exhibiting their logical form must have the first claim on our 
attention. However, there is no particular necessity why oratio obliqua 
sentences should wear their logical form on their sleeves, why their 
semantic structure should be open to our gaze. And thus one must count 
the cost of accepting Davidson’s theory of indirect discourse.'in terms 
of the disadvantages which attach to the proposal that there holds no 
logical or semantic connection between the content—sentence and the 
proceeding attribution of a saying. "This final section is devoted to
- 11-
showing that some of these disadvantages are great indeed. The problems 
discussed are touched upon lightly; but one ends by entertaining the 
suspicion that Geach’s quotational theory of indirect discourse is in 
the last resort the more viable theory.
4. Quantification and Pronouns.
For those who adhere to Davidson’s paratactic theory of indirect 
discourse, the problem arises how to provide an adequate existential 
generalization of an oratio obliqua sentence. This is not to focus 
attention upon the fact that a Davidsonian treatment of the quantified 
sentence "( jx) (Galileo said that x moves)", viz.
(j x)(Galileo said that, x moves)
looks to be nonsensical. For it is a familiar point that the quantified 
sentence itself is of dubious significance. ( Some may even see it as a 
meritorious feature of Davidson’s theory that it is unable to accommodate 
quantifying in, ) Rather, the problem for Davidson is to provide an 
existential generalization of an oratio obliqua sentence like (4), 'viz.
Galileo said that the earth moves
which is not open to the standard objections and which is satisfactory 
in terms of the paratactic theory.
One proposal at this point is to give (4) a Quinean existential 
generalization, thus;
(Jx)(Galileo said y [y moves] of x)
and then ( having reinstated the demonstrative ) subject the whole 
to a Davidsonian treatment, thus:
- 78-
(3^)(Galileo said of x that, y [y moves])
The drawback of this proposal is not that an utterance of 
“y jy moves]" would fail to match Galileo’s utterance of "Eppur si 
muove" in import. For the existential generalization of (4) has to say 
something like this: that there is something such that Galileo said that 
it moves. And thus we would not expect the exact content of Galileo’s 
actual words to be given under such circumstances. 'The real objection 
to the proposal is that it is totally unclear what an utterance of 
"y [y moves]" amounts to.
A natural suggestion is that an utterance of "y [y moves]" 
amounts to an utterance of a sentence containing a pronoun, eg. "It 
moves". The existential generalization of (4) would then look like this:
(9) (3%)(Galileo said of x that. It moves)
Before we proceed to discuss exactly what is wrong with (9) 
as the existential generalization of (4), it must be pointed out how 
Geach would handle the problem. According to Geach, we give an 
existential generalization of an oratio obliqua sentence by quantifying 
into oratio recta. Thus for (4) we would give;
(10) (jx) (Galileo said something tantamount to x''^  "moves")
Here the bound variable ranges over expressions. Another point in 
favour of the method is that no particular problem is posed by 
sentences which involve upon analysis the same expression occurring 
both inside and outside the scope of the indirect speech verb. The 
existential generalization of "Galileo said rightly that the earth 
moves" is given by:
( 1 x)(x^"moves" is a true sentence and Galileo said something
tantamount to x^"moves")
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To return to Davidson, Qhe difficulty with (9) as the existent­
ial generalization of (4) is that it is unclear what semantical role 
is played by the pronoun occurring in the content-sentence. We are 
hinting at an underlying problem facing Davidson; that his theory of 
indirect discourse as given is unable to deal with oratio obliqua 
sentences on their relational reading. Consider one such sentence: 
"Galileo said that some planet moves". The relational reading is 
given by:
(11) Galileo said of some planet that it moves
And ( putting Davidson's theory on one side for the moment ) the 
question we have to answer is this: what semantical role is played 
by the pronoun which figures in the content-sentence of (II)?
One might think that the pronoun "it" in the content-sentence 
of (11) plays the same kind of semantical role as the "it" which 
figures in the second conjunct of:
The dog jumped over the wall, and it bit Socrates
In other words, one might think that the pronoun in (II) is used in 
lieu of a repetitious expression. Geach calls pronouns of this kind 
"pronouns of laziness".
It is a mark of a pronoun of laziness that it can be replaced 
^salva veritate by the expression for which it goes proxy. This expres­
sion need not be the grammatical antecedent of the pronoun; but in the 
case of sentence (II) there is no expression other than the grammatical 
antecedent of the pronoun in the offing. But if the "it" in (11) is 
replaced by the antecedent phrase "some planet", the resulting sentence, 
viz.
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Galileo said of some planet that some planet moves
far from preserving truth-value, does not even seem to preserve signif­
icance, Consequently, the "it" in (11) cannot be a pronoun of laziness. 
There is a second kind of semantical role played by pronouns. 
Thus the "it" in
(12) Socrates owned a dog, and it bit Socrates
is to be viewed not as going proxy for what would be repetitious
language ; but rather as being "bound" by the antecedent applicative!
phrase "a dog", Geach describes the doctrine ( which he accredits
to Quine ) thus;
the pronouns whose antecedents are applicatival phrases 
correspond strictly in their syntax to variables bound by 
quantifiers.^g
Applicatival phrases are phrases like "some astronomer", "each man" 
etc., formed by attaching an applicative to a substantival general 
term.
Let us see how this doctrine applies to (12) in detail. Accord­
ing to Geach, (12) is the result of replacing the schematic letter "F" 
in "F(a dog)" by the predicate:
Socrates owned ____, and   bit Socrates
The same expression can be inserted into each gap of this predicate 
just in case that expression is a logical subject. iMow Geach points 
out that we can render applicatival phrases by quantifiers - using 
restricted quantification. 'Thus (12) becomes:
(13) ( 3 x)dog((Socrates owned x) & (x bit Socrates))
But here the temptation to regard the sentence "Socrates owned a dog"
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as a genuine conjunct of (12) disappears. For the result of detaching
that portion of (13) which appears before the
( 3 x)dog((Socrates owned x)
is ill-formed; having an unpaired parenthesis. If "Socrates owned a 
dog" were a genuine conjunct of (l2), then it would come out as 
"( 3 x)dog(Socrates o'Æied x)",
It would seem reasonable to suppose that the pronoun which 
figures in the content-sentence of the oratio obliqua sentence (II) 
is bound by the antecedent applicatival phrase "some planet". Let us 
draw out the consequences of interpreting the "it" of (II) in this
way. Making our analysis of (II) parallel that given by Geach for (12);
(11) is the result of replacing the schematic letter "F" in "F(some 
planet)" by the predicate;
Galileo said of ____ that   moves
Using restricted quantification, (II) becomes;
(14) ( 3 x)planet(Galileo said of x that x moves)
We have here reached the denouement of our story. For the 
treatment of (II) along Davidsonian lines is incompatible with the 
view that (II) is adequately represented by (14). According to the 
paratactic theory, (II) must be viewed as consisting of two semantically 
independent sentences, thus;
(15) Galileo said of some planet that. It moves.
But if (14) is an adequate representation of (II), then the sentence 
"Galileo said of some planet that" cannot be a genuine constituent of
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(11). For the result of slicing (14) after the "that":
( 3 x)planet(Galileo said of x that
is ill-formed, having an unpaired parenthesis. Were the sentence 
"Galileo said of some planet that" to be a genuine constituent of (II), 
it would have to come out as "(3x)planet(Galileo said of x that)".
And of course the argument works in the opposite direction.
If (15) is a semantically revealing version of (II), then we cannot 
view (11) as the result of replacing the schematic letter "P" in 
"P(some planet)" by a single predicate. But in that case we cannot 
regard the pronoun in the content-sentence of (II) as bound by the 
antecedent applicatival phrase "some planet".
'The conclusion seems to be warranted that Davidson must give 
up at least one of the following two claims which he forwards as part 
of his theory:
(a ) The content-sentence ( of an oratio obliqua sentence )
has no logical or semantic connection with the attribution
of a saying which goes before;
(B) The content-sentence has a familiar semantic structure
which "... poses no problem for theory of truth not there
19before indirect discourse was the theme".
For the ascription of familiar structure to the content-sentence of
(11) implies that the pronoun therein stands in a semantic relation 
towards its antecedent. But in that case there would be an explicit 
semantic connection between the content-sentence and the proceeding 
attribution of a saying. On the other hand, espousal of claim (A) 
suggests that the pronoun-antecedent relation in (II) is not a semantic 
one; and thus that the pronoun which figures in the content-sentence
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is playing an unfamiliar semantical role.
With a view to leaving intact as much of Davidson's theory as 
possible, (b) would appear to be the more dispensable of the two 
claims. For Davidson is quite right when he describes the point under­
lying claim (a ) as that upon which everything depends. It is not 
hard to see why he regards the semantic independence of performative 
and content-sentence as constituting the cornerstone of his theory. 
Davidson's explanation of the apparent failure of extensionality 
associated with oratio obliqua is radical precisely because it involves 
treating ( an utterance of ) the content-sentence as nothing more than 
an object of reference. Substitutions within the content-sentence 
amount to changes in the reference of the demonstrative which figures 
in the performative; and the semantical contribution made by the 
demonstrative towards the truth-value of the performative is altered 
thereby. The point is that this account of the apparent failure of 
extensionality would be vitiated were the expressions in the content- 
sentence to be viewed as making a direct semantical contribution 
towards the truth-value of the performative. The connection forged by 
Davidson between the performative and the content-sentence ( qua 
reference of the demonstrative ) would be made redundant.
Consequently, the pronoun-antecedent relation in (ll) cannot 
be viewed as a semantic one by those who cleave to Davidson's theory. 
And thus work needs to be done to explain the semantical role played 
by the kind of pronoun which figures in the content-sentence of an 
oratio obliqua sentence on its relational reading. One possibility is 
that an explanation which meets the demands of the paratactic theory 
simply cannot be given, that the pronoun-antecedent relation in (11) 
must be viewed as a semantic one. There is, however, no need to be
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unduly pessimistic. A proposal which might bear investigation is to 
count the pronouns in question as corresponding in their syntax to 
free variables. One thing, however, is clear; that much of the 
simplicity which seemed to attach to Davidson's theory has disappeared. 
Strictly speaking, oratio obliqua sentences can no longer be seen as 
wearing their logical form on their sleeves. And that, after all, was 
the selling point of Davidson's theory.
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